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Are some management practices akin to a technology that can explain company and national productivity, or do 
they simply reflect contingent management styles? We collect data on core management practices from over 
11,000 firms in 34 countries. We find large cross-country differences in the adoption of basic management 
practices, with the US having the highest size-weighted average management score. We present a formal model 
of \Management as a Technology", and structurally estimate it using panel data to recover parameters including 
the depreciation rate and adjustment costs of managerial capital (both found to be larger than for tangible non-
managerial capital). Our model also predicts (i) a positive effect of management on firm performance; (ii) a 
positive relationship between product market competition and average management quality (part of which stems 
from the larger covariance between management with firm size as competition strengthens); and (iii) a rise (fall) 
in the level (dispersion) of management with firm age. We find strong empirical support for all of these 
predictions in our data. Finally, building on our model, we find that differences in management practices 
account for about 30% of cross-country total factor productivity differences. 
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1 Introduction
Productivity differences between firms and between countries remain startling. For example, within
the average four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries, Syverson (2011) finds that labor productivity
for plants at the 90th percentile was four times as high as plants at the 10th percentile. Even after
controlling for other factors, Total Factor Productivity (TFP) was almost twice as high. These
differences persist over time and are robust to controlling for plant-specific prices in homogeneous
goods industries.1 Such TFP heterogeneity is evident in all other countries where data is available.2
One explanation is that these persistent within industry productivity differentials are due to “hard”
technological innovations, as embodied in patents or the adoption of advanced equipment. Another
explanation, which is the focus of this paper, is that productivity differences reflect variations in
management practices.
We advance the idea that some forms of management practices are like a “technology”, in the sense
that they raise TFP. This has a number of empirical implications that we examine and find support
for in the data. Our perspective on management is distinct from the dominant “Design” paradigm
in organizational economics, which views management as a question of optimal design depending
on the contingent features of a firm’s environment (Gibbons and Roberts, 2013). In this contingent
view of management practices, there is no sense in which any management styles are on average
better than any others. Our data provides some support for Design perspective, but we show that
- at least within the very stylized version of this perspective that we consider - this delivers only a
partial explanation of the patterns that we can observe in our data.
To date, empirical work to measure differences in management practices across firms and countries
has been limited. Despite this lack of data, the core theories in many fields such as international
trade, labor economics, industrial organization and macroeconomics are now incorporating firm
heterogeneity as a central component.3
To address the lack of management data, we collect original survey data on management practices
on over 11,000 firms in 34 countries. Besides its rich cross sectional nature, both in terms of
countries and industries covered, this dataset also features a significant panel component built
through four different survey waves from 2004 to 2014. We first present some stylized facts from
this database in the cross country and cross firm dimensions. One of the striking features of the
1These are revenue based measures of TFP (“TFPR”) so will also reflect firm-specific mark-ups. Foster, Halti-
wanger and Syverson (2008) show large differences in TFP even within very homogeneous goods industries such
as cement and block ice. Hall and Jones (1999) and Jones and Romer (2010) show how the stark differences in
productivity across countries account for a substantial fraction of the differences in average income.
2Usually productivity dispersion is even greater than in other countries than in the U.S. - see Bartelsman, Halti-
wanger and Scarpetta (2013) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
3Different fields have different labels for management. In trade, the focus is on an initial productivity draw when
the plant enters an industry that persists over time (e.g. Melitz, 2003). In industrial organization, the focus has
traditionally been on cost heterogeneity due to entrepreneurial/managerial talent (e.g. Lucas, 1978). In macro,
organizational capital is sometimes related to the firm specific managerial know-how built up over time (e.g. Prescott
and Visscher 1980). In labor, there is a growing focus on how the wage distribution requires an understanding of the
heterogeneity of firm productivity (e.g. Card, Heining and Kline, 2013).
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data is that the average management score, just like TFP, is higher in the U.S. than it is in other
countries (see Figure 1). A second striking feature - shown in Figure 2 - is that management, like
TFP, shows a wide dispersion across firms within each country. Interestingly, this dispersion is
lower in countries like the U.S. with lower levels of market frictions than it is in countries like India
and Brazil.
We detail a simple model of “Management As a Technology” (MAT) which incorporates both
a heterogeneous initial draw of managerial ability when a firm starts up, and the endogenous
response of ongoing firms who change their level of managerial capital in response to shocks to
the environment (modeled as as idiosyncratic TFP shocks). The model is useful to formalize our
theoretical intuitions and enable structural estimation of key parameters. In particular, thanks to
the cross sectional and panel variation present in the management data, we are able to identify the
depreciation rate and adjustment costs of managerial capital, using Simulated Method of Moments
(SMM). A further benefit of the structural model is that it enables us to derive some additional
predictions on moments we did not target in the structural estimation.
We find that the data supports the predictions from the MAT model. First, management is posi-
tively associated with improved firm performance (e.g. productivity, profitability and survival), and
from experimental evidence the management effect appears to be causal. Second, firm management
rises with more intense product market competition, both through reallocating more economic ac-
tivity to the better managed firms (an Olley and Pakes,1996, covariance term), and also through a
higher unweighted average level of management. Third, older firms have a higher level of manage-
ment, but lower dispersion due to selection effects. We contrast our MAT model to the predictions
arising from a very stylized version of the “Management As Design” model, an alternative approach
which sees management as a contingent “Design” feature, rather than an output increasing factor of
production. There are some elements consistent with this second design approach, especially when
we disaggregate the management score into elements relating to monitoring compared relative to
incentives. However, overall the MAT model seems a better description of our data.
Finally, using our MAT model we show that on average just under a third of cross country TFP
differences with the U.S. are accounted for by management, with this fraction being higher in
OECD countries than in less developed nations. Thus, management practices can account for a
substantial portion of cross-country differences in development. Within this portion, 30% is due to
differences in the covariance between management and firm size - that is, differences in reallocation
effects - and the remaining 70% by differences in average unweighted management.
This paper relates to several literatures. First, there is a large body of empirical literature on the
importance of management for variations in firm and national productivity, going back to Walker
(1887) through to more recent papers like Ichniowski et al. (1997), Bertrand and Schoar (2003),
Adhvaryu, Kala and Nyshadham (2016) and Bruhn, Karlan and Schoar (2016). Second, there
is a growing macro literature on aggregate implications of firm management and organizational
structure, ranging from Lucas (1978), to Gennaioli et al (2013), Guner and Ventura (2014), Garicano
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and Rossi-Hansberg (2015) and Akcigit, Alp and Peters (2016). Finally, there is another growing
literature focusing on explaining cross-country TFP in terms of the degree of reallocation out inputs
to more productivity firms, most notably Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008).
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first describe some theories of management (Section
2) and how we collect the management data (Section 3). We then describe some of the data and
stylized facts (Section 4). Section 5 details our empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Models of management
2.1 Conventional approaches to modeling heterogeneity in firm productivity
Econometricians have often labeled the fixed effect in panel data estimates of production functions
“management ability”. However, for the most part economists have focused on how technological
innovations drive economic growth; for example, correlating TFP with observable measures of
innovation such as R&D, patents, or information technology.
There is robust evidence of the impact of such “hard” technologies for productivity growth.4 Nev-
ertheless, there are at least two major problems in focusing on these aspects of technical change as
the sole cause of productivity dispersion. First, even after controlling for a wide range of observ-
able measures of hard technologies, a large residual in measured TFP still remains. Second, many
studies have found that the impact of technology on productivity varies widely across firms and
countries. In particular, information technology (IT) has much larger effects on the productivity
of firms that have complementary managerial structures which enable IT to be more efficiently
exploited.5Furthermore, a huge body of case study work also suggests a major role for management
in raising firm performance (e.g. Baker and Gil, 2013).
In light of these issues, we believe it is worth directly considering management practices as an
independent factor in raising productivity.
2.2 Formal models of management
It is useful to analytically distinguish between two broad approaches that we can embed in a simple
production function framework where value added, Y, is produced as follows:
Y = F (A˜, L,K,M) (1)
4For example, see Griliches (1998).
5In their case study of IT in retail banking, for example, Autor et al (2002) found that banks who failed to
re-organize the physical and social relations within the workplace reaped little reward from new ICT (like ATM
machines). More generally, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) found that decentralized organizations tended
to enjoy a higher productivity pay-off from IT across a wide range of sectors. Similarly, Bloom, Sadun and Van
Reenen (2012) found that IT productivity was higher for firms with stronger incentives management (e.g. careful
hiring, merit based pay and promotion and vigorously fixing/firing under-performers).
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where A˜ is an efficiency term, labor is L, non-management capital is K, and M is management
capital.
We begin with the “Management as Technology” perspective, where some types of management
(or bundles of management practices) are better than others for firms across a wide range of
environments. There are three types of these “best practices”. First, there are some practices that
have always been better (e.g. not promoting incompetent employees to senior positions, or collecting
some information before making decisions). Second, there may be genuine managerial innovations
(e.g. Taylor’s Scientific Management; Lean Manufacturing; Deming’s Quality movement, etc.) in
the same way that there are technological innovations. Third, many management practices may
have become optimal due to changes in the economic environment over time. Incentive pay may be
an example of this, as the incidence of piece rates declined from the late 19th century, but appears
to be making a comeback today.6
The alternative model is the traditional approach in Organizational Economics, i.e. the “Man-
agement as a Design” perspective, where differences in practices are styles optimized to a firm’s
environment. For any indicator of M, such as the measures we gather, the Design approach would
not assume that output is monotonically increasing in M. In some circumstances, higher levels of
what we would regard as good practices will explicitly reduce output. To take a simple example,
consider M as a discrete variable which is equal to one if promotion takes into account effort and
ability and zero otherwise (e.g. purely seniority based promotions). The Design perspective could
find that pure tenure-based promotion, which ignores effort and ability, increases output in some
sectors, for example by reducing influencing activities (Milgrom, 1988), but increases it in others.
Under the Design approach, the production function can be written as equation (1), but for some
firms and practices F ′(M) ≤ 0. Even if M were costless, output would fall if it was exogenously
increased. The Design approach emphasizes that the reason for heterogeneity in the adoption
of different practices is that firms face different environments. This is in the same spirit as the
“contingency” paradigm in management science (Woodward, 1958).
The Design and the Technology perspectives can be nested within a common basic set-up but have,
as we show, very different theoretical and empirical implications. Leaving aside for the moment the
specific modeling choice of F (M), we formalize these ideas by treating M as an intangible capital
(as in Corrado and Hulten, 2010), which has a market price and also a cost of adjustment. We
allow firms to have an exogenous initial draw of M when they enter the economy. This creates ex
ante heterogeneity between firms (generalizing the approach in Hopenhayn, 1992, for TFP). Factor
inputs and outputs are firm specific (we do not use t subscripts for simplicity unless needed). We
consider a single industry, so firm-specific values are indicated by an i subscript
Yi = A˜iK
α
i L
β
i G˜(Mi) (2)
6Lemieux et al (2009) suggest that this may be due to advances in IT. Software companies like SAP have made
it much easier to measure output in a timely and robust fashion, making effective incentive pay schemes easier to
design and implement.
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where G˜(Mi) is a management function common to all firms. Demand is assumed to derive from a
final good sector (or equivalently a consumer) using a CES aggregator across individual inputs:
Y = N
1
1−ρ
(
N∑
i=1
Y
ρ−1
ρ
i
) ρ
ρ−1
(3)
where ρ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, N is the number of firms and N
1
1−ρ is the standard
adjustment factor to make the degree of substitution scale free. Our main index of competition will
be ρ. Applying the first order conditions gives each firm an inverse demand curve with elasticity ρ
where we have normalized the industry price to be P = 1
Pi = (
Y
N
)
1
ρ
Y
−1
ρ
i = BY
− 1
ρ
i
where the demand shifter is B = ( YN )
1
ρ
. These production and demand curves generate the firm’s
revenue function:
PiYi = AiK
a
i L
b
iG(Mi)
where for analytical tractability we defined Ai = A˜i
1−1/ρ
( YN )
1
ρ
, a = α(1 − 1/ρ), b = β(1 − 1/ρ)
and G(Mi) = G˜(Mi)
(1−1/ρ). Profits, defined as revenues less capital, labor and management costs
(cK(K), cL(L) and cM (M)), and fixed costs F are:
7
Πi = AiK
a
i L
b
iG(Mi)− cK(Ki)− cL(Li)− cM (Mi)− F
2.3 Models of management in production
In terms of the management function G˜(Mi), we consider two broad classes of models. First,
Management as a Technology where management is an intangible capital input in which output
is monotonically increasing. Second, Management as Design in which management is a choice of
production approach. We focus on the first as this fits the data substantially better (as we show
below) but lay out both approaches in what follows.
2.3.1 Management as a Technology (MAT)
In Lucas (1978) or Melitz (2003) style models, firm performance is increasing continuously in
the level of managerial quality, which is synonymous with productivity. Firms draw a level of
management quality when they are born, and this continues with them throughout their lives.
Since these types of models assume G(Mi) is increasing in Mi, we simplify the revenue function by
7Since firms in our data are typically small in relation to their input and output markets, for tractability we ignore
any general equilibrium effects, taking all input prices (for capital, labor and management) as constant.
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assuming G(Mi) = M
c
i
PiYi = AiK
a
i L
b
iM
c
i
More generally, we want to allow for the possibility that management can also be endogenously
improved; for example, by hiring management consultants, spending time developing improved
organizational processes (e.g. Toyota’s Kaizen meetings), or paying for a better CEO. Although
managerial capital can be improved in this way, failure to invest may mean it depreciates over time
like other tangible and intangible assets such as physical capital, R&D, and advertising. Hence, we
set up a more general model which still has initial heterogeneous draws of management when firms
enter, but treats management as an intangible capital stock with depreciation:
Mit = (1− δM )Mit−1 + IMit IMit ≥ 0
where IMit reflects investment in management practices, which has a non-negativity constraint
reflecting the fact that managerial capital cannot be sold. The physical capital accumulation
equation is similar except it allows for capital resale with a resale loss of φK
Kit = (1− δK)Kit−1 + IKit − φKD[IKit < 0]
where D[IKit < 0] is an indicator function for negative investment (capital sales). Both manage-
rial and non-managerial investment goods can be purchased in the market at price wMt and w
K
t
respectively.
2.3.2 Management as Design
An alternative approach is to assume that management practices are contingent on a firm’s envi-
ronment, so that increases in M do not always increase output. In some sectors, high values of M
will increase output, and in others they will reduce output depending on the specific features of the
industry. We assume that optimal management practices may vary by industry and country, but
this could also occur across other characteristics like firm age, size, or growth rate. For example,
industries employing large numbers of highly skilled employees, like pharmaceuticals, will require
large investments in careful hiring, tying rewards to performance and monitoring output, while
low-tech industries can make do without these costly human resource practices. Likewise, optimal
management practices could vary by country if, for example, some cultures are more comfortable
with firing persistently under-performing employees (e.g. the U.S.) while others emphasize loyalty
to long-serving employees (e.g. Japan).
There are many ways to set up a Design model. As a simple example we define G˜(Mi) = 1/(1 +
θ|Mi−M |) where θ ≥ 0 and G˜(Mi) ∈ (0, 1] is decreasing in the absolute deviation of M from its opti-
mal levelM.8 There are of course many other ways to code this up - and this is certainly not meant to
8Our baseline case also assumes that M is a choice variable that does not have to be paid for on an ongoing basis
so that δM = 0 although this assumption is not material.
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2.3.3 Management as Capital?
We initially debated calling our main approach “Management as Capital” (rather than “Man-
agement as a Technology”), viewing management as an intangible capital stock (see for example
Bruhn, Karlan and Schoar (2010)). In the end, because of the evidence suggesting management
spillovers across plants within firms and between different firms (e.g. Greenstone, Hornbeck and
Moretti (2010), Atalay, Hortascu and Syverson (2014) and Braguinsky et al. (2015) and Bloom et
al. (2016)) we thought modeling management as a technology seemed more appropriate. However,
we recognize that either terminology could be used. Indeed, the classic technology input - the R&D
knowledge stock - is recorded as an intangible capital input by the Bureau of Economic Activity in
U.S. National Accounts.
2.4 Adjustment costs and dynamics
In general, changing a capital stock will mean bearing adjustment costs. This could reflect, for
example, the costs of the organizational resistance to new management practices (e.g. Cyert
and March, 1963 or Atkin et al. (2015)). We assume changing management practices involves
a quadratic adjustment cost:
CM (Mt,Mt−1) = γMMt−1(
Mt −Mt−1
Mt−1
− δM )2
where the cost is proportional to the squared change in management net of depreciation, and scaled
by lagged management to avoid firms outgrowing adjustment costs. This style of adjustment costs is
common for capital (e.g. Chirinko, 1993) and seems reasonable for management where incremental
changes in practices are likely to meet less resistance than large changes. Likewise, we also assume
similar quadratic adjustment costs for non-managerial capital:
CK(Kt,Kt−1) = γKKt−1(
Kt −Kt−1
Kt−1
− δK)2
To minimize on the number of state variables in the model, we assume labor is costlessly adjustable,
but requires a per period wage rate of w. Given this assumption on labor, we can define the optimal
choice of labor by ∂PY (A,K,L
∗,M)
∂L = w. Imposing this labor optimality condition and assuming the
MAT specification for management in the production function, we obtain:
Y ∗(A,K,M) = A∗K
a
1−bM
c
1−b
8
represent the wide range of Design approaches - but is a simple example to illustrate the 
implications of a G~ (Mi ) function which attains an interior maximum (so that an 
optimal choice of management exists rather than higher values always increasing output).
where A∗ = b
b
1−bA
1
1−b and we normalize w to unity. Finally, ln(A) is assumed to follow a standard
AR(1) process so that ln(Ait) = lnA0+ρAln(Ai,t−1)+σAεi,t where εi,t ∼ N(0, 1). This will generate
the firm-specific dynamics in the model, which are an important feature of our data.
2.5 Optimization and equilibrium
Given the firm’s three state variables - business conditions A, capital K, and management M - we
can write a value function (dropping i -subscripts for brevity):
V (At,Kt,Mt) = max[V
c(At,Kt,Mt), 0]
V c(At,Kt,Mt) = max
Kt+1,Mt+1
[Y ∗t − CK(Kt+1,Kt)− CM (Mt+1,Mt)− F
+ βEtV (At+1,Kt+1,Mt+1)]
where the first maximum reflects the decision to continue in operation or exit (where exit occurs
when V c < 0), the second (V c for “continuers”) is the optimization of capital and management
conditional on operation, and β is the discount factor. We assume there is a continuum of potential
new entrants that would have to pay an entry cost κ to enter. Upon entry, they take a stochastic
draw of their productivity and management values from a known joint distribution H(A,M) and
start with K0 = 0. Hence, entry occurs until the point that
κ =
∫
V (A,K0,M)dH(A,M)
We solve for the steady-state equilibrium by selecting the demand shifter (B = ( YN )
1
ρ
) that ensures
that the expected cost of entry equals the expected value of entry given the optimal capital and
management decisions. This equilibrium is characterized by a distribution of firms in terms of their
state values A,K,M . The distribution of lnA is assumed normal, while M is assumed to be drawn
from a uniform distribution.9
2.6 Numerical Estimation
Solving the model requires finding two nested fixed-points.10 First, we solve for the value functions
for incumbent firms using the contraction mapping (e.g. Stokey and Lucas, 1986), taking demand
as given for each firm. The policy correspondences for M and K are formed from the optimal
choices given these value functions, and for L from the static first-order condition. Second, we then
iterate over the demand curve (3) to satisfy the zero-profit condition.11 Once both fixed points
9Nothing fundamental hinges on the exact distributional assumptions for M and A.
10The full replication package for the simulation and SMM estimation is available on
http://web.stanford.edu/˜nbloom/MAT.zip
11If there is positive expected profit then net entry occurs and the demand shifter B = ( Y
N
)
1
ρ
falls, and if there is
negative expected profit then net exit occurs.
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are satisfied, we simulate data for 5,000 firms over 100 years to get to an ergodic steady-state, and
then discard the first 90 periods to keep the last 10 years of data (to match the time span of our
management panel data).
To solve and simulate this model we also need to define a set of 15 parameter values. We pre-define
nine of these from from the prior literature, normalize two (fixed costs to 100 and the mean of
ln(TFP) to 1) and estimate the remaining four parameters on our management and accounting
data panel. The nine predefined parameters are listed in Table 1, and are all based on standard
values in the literature. The four estimated parameters are those where much less is known from
the literature. The adjustment cost (γM ) and depreciation rates (δK) for management have never
been estimated before, to our knowledge. The sunk cost of entry (κ) is also hard to know. Finally,
we also estimate the adjustment cost for non-managerial capital (γK).
12
To estimate the model by SMM we picked four data moments to match: the exit rate to help
inform the sunk cost entry, and the variance of the five-year growth rates of the three state vari-
ables (management capital, non-management capital, and TFP) to tie down the adjustment cost
and depreciation parameters. These data moments were generated on the matched management-
accounting panel dataset for all countries from 2004 to 2014 (described in more detail in the next
section). To generate standard-errors, we block-bootstrapped over firms the entire process 1,000
times to generate the variance-covariance matrix, which was also used to optimally weight the SMM
criterion function (see Appendix C for details).
2.7 Simulation results
The top panel of Table 2 contains the SMM estimates and standard errors values for the four
estimated parameters, and the bottom panel contains the moments from the data used to estimate
these. Because the model is exactly identified we can precisely match the moments within numerical
rounding errors.
The estimation of the adjustment costs for management is one of the novel contributions of this
paper. We obtain a slightly higher level of adjustment costs for management of 0.207 (compared to
0.189 for capital) which, alongside the irreversibility of management, helps generate smoother man-
agement five-year growth moments compared to capital five-year growth moments (see the bottom
panel of Table 2).13 These magnitudes are prima facie plausible - economic intuition (Cyert and
March, 1963) and anecdotal evidence from the private equity and management consulting industry
suggest that management practices are likely to be harder to change than plant or equipment.
Depreciation of management capital is is 13.3%, similar to the level of the depreciation of capital
12While prior papers have estimated labor and capital adjustment costs (e.g. Bloom, 2009, and the survey therein)
they ignore management as an input so it is not clear these parameters are transferable to our set-up.
13If we allow management to be have the same 50% resale loss as capital it’s adjustment cost is estimated to be
0.290, about 50% higher than the value for capital.
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(10% - see Table 1).14 Finally, we obtain a sunk cost of entry that is 166% of the ongoing annual
fixed cost of running a plant.
Having defined and estimated the main MAT model, we can proceed to examine covariances of
various moments that we have not targeted in the structural estimation to later compare these
with actual data. Figures 3 through 5 show some predictions arising from the simulation. In
Figure 3, we start by comparing the distribution of management practices of a random draw of
15,489 firm-years from our simulation to the 15,489 firm-year surveys in the management panel
data, revealing similar cross-sectional distributions.15 While this is not a formal test of our model,
it does confirm it can generate the wide spread of management practices that is a striking finding
of the management survey data. Figures A2 and A3 show the unsurprising result that firm size
and TFP are increasing in the firm-level value of management.
Figure 4 examines the relationship between management and product market competition as in-
dexed by the elasticity of demand (ρ). We run all the simulation for increasingly high levels of the
absolute price elasticity of demand between three and fifteen (recall that our baseline is an elasticity
is equal to five). This represents economies with increasingly high levels of competition. We see
that average management scores are higher when competition is stronger. The darker bars are the
unweighted means of management across firms - they rise because under higher competition poorly
managed firms tend to exit as they cannot cover their fixed cost of production. We also see that size
(employment) weighted management practices rise even faster with competition because this raises
the covariance between firm size and management (a higher “Olley Pakes reallocation” term), as
better managed firms will acquire larger market shares (and therefore need more inputs). Finally,
Figure 5 examines the relationship between management and firm age. Firms’ management score
rises with age as poorly managed firms either improve or exit the market. Over time this leads the
dispersion of management practices to fall within any age cohort, because of the contraction of the
left tail of poorly managed firms.
Figure 6 Panels A to C provide similar figures to Figures 3 to 5 for our Management as Design
model, in which we assume G(M) is maximized at M = 3 for illustrative purposes. In Panel
A, we see a similar spread of management practices, suggesting the Design view can generate an
equilibrium dispersion of management practices. But in Panel B we see a very different relationship
with competition, where management practices are invariant with the level of competition. More
specifically, there is no sense in which high levels of management are better, and therefore they
are not positively selected as competition increases. In Panel C, we also see no variation in the
average management score with age for similar reasons, although we do see some reduction in
variance with age as extremely high and low values of management practices are modified or the
firm exits. Finally, in Panel D we have also included a plot of performance in terms of sales against
14One interpretation is that management capital is tied to the the identity of plant managers. The average job
tenure for plant managers in our survey is 6.4 year in the post and and 13.0 years in the company, which would imply
post and company quit rates of about 15% to 7% spanning the depreciation estimate of 10%.
15To scale our management practices we take logs of the management variable, and normalize the lowest value to
1 and the higher value to 5 to replicate our management survey scoring tool.
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management, showing the inverted U shape implied by the Design view of the world that firms
have an optimizing level of M at 3.
3 Data
3.1 WMS Survey method
We describe the datasets in more detail in Appendix A, but sketch out the important features
here. To measure management practices, we developed a survey methodology known as the World
Management Survey (WMS).16 This uses an interview-based evaluation tool that defines 18 basic
management practices and scores them from one (“worst practice”) to five (“best practice”) on a
scoring grid. This evaluation tool was first developed by an international consulting firm, and scores
these practices in three broad areas.17 First, Monitoring : how well do companies track what goes on
inside their firms, and use this for continuous improvement? Second, Target setting : do companies
set the right targets, track outcomes, and take appropriate action if the two are inconsistent?
Third, Incentives/people management18: are companies promoting and rewarding employees based
on performance, and systematically trying to hire and retain their best employees?
To obtain accurate responses from firms, we interview production plant managers using a “double-
blind” technique. One part of this technique is that managers are not told in advance they are
being scored or shown the scoring grid. They are only told they are being “interviewed about
management practices for a piece of work”. The other side of the double blind technique is that
the interviewers do not know anything about the performance of the firm.
To run this blind scoring, we used “open” questions. For example, on the first monitoring question
we start by asking the open question, “tell me how your monitor your production process”, rather
than closed questions such as “Do you monitor your production daily? [yes/no]”. We continue
with open questions focused on actual practices and examples until the interviewer can make an
accurate assessment of the firm’s practices. For example, the second question on that performance
tracking dimension is, “What kinds of measures would you use to track performance?” and the
third is “If I walked around your factory, could I tell how each person was performing?”.19
The other side of the double-blind technique is that interviewers are not told anything about the
firm’s performance in advance. They are only provided with the company name, telephone number,
16More details can be found at http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/
17Bertrand and Schoar (2003) focus on the characteristics and style of the CEO and CFO, and more specifically
on differences in strategic management (e.g. decision making applied to mergers and acquisitions), while Lazear,
Shaw and Stanton (2016) focus on individual supervisors. The type of practices we analyze in this paper are closer
to operational and human resource practices.
18These practices are similar to those emphasized in earlier work on management practices, by for example Ich-
niowski, Prennushi and Shaw (1997) .
19The full list of questions for the grid is in Table A1 and (with more examples) at
http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/wp-content/images/2010/09/Manufacturing-Survey-Instrument.pdf.
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and industry. Since we randomly sample medium-sized manufacturing firms (employing between
50 and 5,000 workers) who are not usually reported in the business press, the interviewers will
generally have not heard of these firms before, so they should have few preconceptions.20
The survey was targeted at plant managers, who are senior enough to have an overview of manage-
ment practices but not so senior as to be detached from day-to-day operations. We also collected
a series of “noise controls” on the interview process itself - such as the time of day, day of the
week, characteristics of the interviewee, and the identity of the interviewer. Including these in our
regression analysis typically helps to improve our estimation precision by stripping out some of the
random measurement error.
To ensure high sample response rates and informative interviews, we hired students with some
business experience and training. We also obtained government endorsements for the surveys in
each country covered. We also never asked interviewees for financial data, obtaining this instead
from independent sources on company accounts.
Finally, the interviewers were encouraged to be persistent - so they ran about two interviews a
day lasting 45 minutes each on average, with the rest of the time (about 6 hours a day) spent
repeatedly contacting managers to schedule interviews. This process, while time consuming and
expensive, helped to yield a 41% response rate which was uncorrelated with the (independently
collected) performance measures.
3.2 Survey waves
We have administered the survey in several waves since 2004. There were five major waves in
2004, 2006, 2009/10, 2013, and 2014. In 2004 we surveyed four countries (France, Germany, the
U.K. and the U.S.). In 2006 we expanded this to twelve countries (including Brazil, China, India,
and Japan), continuing random sampling, but in addition to a refreshment sample for the 2004
countries we also re-contacted all of the original 2004 firms to establish a panel. In 2009/10 we
re-contacted all the firms surveyed in 2004 and 2006, but did not do a refreshment sample (due to
budgetary constraints). In 2013 we added an additional number of countries (mainly in Africa and
Latin America). In 2014 we again did a refreshment sample, but also followed up the panel firms
in the U.S. and some E.U. countries. The final sample includes 34 countries and a panel of up to
four different years between 2004 and 2014 for some firms. In the full dataset we have 11,383 firms
and 15,489 interviews where we have usable management information.
20We focus on firms over a size threshold because the formal management practices we consider are likely to be
less important for smaller firms. We had a maximum size threshold because we only interviewed one or two plant
managers in each firm, so would have too incomplete a picture for very large firms. Below, we show tests suggesting
our results are not biased by using this sampling scheme (see Appendix B).
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3.3 Internal validation
We re-surveyed 5% of the sample using a second interviewer to independently survey a second
plant manager in the same firm. The idea is that the two independent management interviews
on different plants within the same firms reveal how consistently we are measuring management
practices. We found that in the sample of 222 re-rater interviews, the correlation between our
independently run first and second interview scores was 0.51 (p-value 0.001). Part of this difference
across plants within the same firm is likely to be real internal variations in management practices,
with the rest presumably reflecting survey measurement error. The highly significant correlation
across the two interviews suggests that while our management score is clearly noisy, it is picking
up significant management differences across firms.
3.4 Some descriptive statistics
The bar chart in Figure 1 plots the average (unweighted) management practice score across coun-
tries. This shows that the U.S. has the highest average management practice score, with the
Germans, Japanese, Swedes, and Canadians below, followed by a block of West European countries
(e.g. France, Italy and the U.K.) and Australia. Below this group is Southern European countries
(e.g. Portugal and Greece) and Poland. Emerging economies (e.g. Brazil, China, and India) are
next, and low income countries (mainly in Africa) are at the bottom. In one sense this cross-country
ranking is not surprising since it approximates the cross-country productivity ranking. But the cor-
relation is far from perfect - Southern European countries do a lot worse than expected and other
nations, like Poland and Mexico, do better.21
A key question is whether management practices are uniformly better in some countries like the
U.S. compared to India, or if differences in the shape of the distribution drive the averages? Figure
2 plots the firm-level histogram of management practices (solid bars) for all countries pooled (top
left) and then for each country individually. This shows that management practices, just like firm-
level productivity, display tremendous variation within countries. Of the total firm-level variation
in management only 13% is explained by country of firm location, a further 10% by industry
(measured at the three digit SIC level), with the remaining 77% being within country and industry.
Interestingly, countries like Brazil and India have a far larger left tail (e.g. scores of two or less) of
badly run firms than the U.S. .22 This immediately suggests that one reason for the better average
performance in the U.S. is that the American economy is better at selecting out the badly managed
firms. We pursue the idea that the U.S. advantage may be linked to stronger forces of competition
below.
21Polish management appears to be better because of the influence of the large numbers of German multinational
subsidiaries, while Mexico similarly benefits from a heavy U.S. multinational presence
22For example, the skewness of the firm level management distribution in the U.S. is 0.09, whereas the skewness of
the distribution in Brazil is 0.16 and 0.36 in India.
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Figure A1 shows average management scores in domestic firms (i.e. those who are not part of
groups with overseas plants) compared to plants belonging to foreign subsidiaries. The average
scores in domestic plants look similar to those in Figure 1, which is unsurprising as most of our
firms are domestic. More interesting is that plants belonging to foreign multinationals appear
to score highly in almost every country, suggesting that such firms are able to transplant their
management practices internationally. This finding - which is robust to controlling for many other
factors (such as firm size, age and industry) - is consistent with the idea of a subset of global,
productivity enhancing practices. An interesting extension to our basic model would be to allow
for this type of cross-plant transfer of management practices (e.g. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple,
2004) but for parsimony in the current model we have not done so.
3.5 Managerial and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS)
We also implemented a more traditional closed question “tick box” survey design for MOPS which
gives us management data on 31,793 U.S. manufacturing plants in 2010. The question design was
modeled on WMS and the response to the MOPS was very high as we worked with the U.S and
replies were legally mandatory. Census Bureau. Details on MOPS is in Bloom et al (2016) and
Appendix A. One advantage of MOPS is that it has much more reliable information on plant and
firm age than in WMS - as discussed in later sections of this paper - so we use MOPS for one of
our theoretical predictions on the relationship between management and age.
4 Implications of Management as a Technology
4.1 Management and firm performance
Basic results
The most obvious implication of the MAT model is that high management scores should be asso-
ciated with better firm performance. Figure A2 plots firm sales on firm management and Figure
A3 does the same for conventionally measured firm TFP and management scores using local linear
regressions. Both figures show a clear positive and monotonic relationship. To probe this bivariate
relationship more formally, we run some simple regressions. We z-score each individual practice,
average across all 18 questions, and z-scored this average so the management index has a stan-
dard deviation of unity.23 Table 3 examines the correlation between different measures of firm
performance and management. To measure firm performance we used company accounts data24,
23We have experimented with other ways of aggregating the management scores such as using principal component
analysis. Since the 18 questions are all positively correlated these more sophisticated alternatives produce broadly
similar results to those developed here. Sub-section 4.5 below describes some other ways of dis-aggregating the scores
into sub-components that reveals evidence for the Design perspective.
24Our sampling frame contained 90% private firms and 10% publicly listed firms. In most OECD countries both
public and private firms publish basic accounts. In the U.S., Canada and India, however, private firms do not publish
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estimating production functions where Qit is proxied by the real sales of firm i at time t :
lnQit = αMMit + αLlnLit + αK lnKit + αXxit + uit (4)
where Mit is the empirical management score
25, xit is a vector of other controls such as the pro-
portion of employees with a college degree, noise controls (e.g. interviewer dummies), country and
three digit SIC industry dummies and uit is an error term. In column (1) of Table 3 we regress
ln(sales) against ln(employment) and the management score, finding a highly significant coefficient
of 0.356. This suggests that firms with one standard deviation of the management score are associ-
ated with 36 log points higher labor productivity (i.e. about 43%). In column (2) we add the capital
stock and other controls which causes the coefficient on management to drop to 0.159, although it
remains significant. Column (3) conditions on a sub-sample where we observe each firm in at least
two years to show the effects are stable, while column (4) re-estimates the specification including
a full set of firm fixed effects to identify from changes in management over time, a very tough test
given the likelihood of attenuation bias. The coefficient on management (and labor and capital)
does fall, but remains positive and significant.26 In column (5) we instead use the Olley and Pakes
(1996) estimator of productivity and obtain a significant management coefficient of 0.231.
As discussed above, one of the most basic predictions is that better managed firms should be
larger than poorly managed firms. Column (6) of Table 3 shows that better managed firms are
significantly larger than poorly managed firms with a one standard deviation of management asso-
ciated with a 40 log point (49%) increase in employment size. In column (7) we use profitability
as the dependent variable as measured by ROCE (Return on Capital Employed) and show again
a positive association with management. Considering more dynamic measures, column (8) uses
sales growth as a dependent variable, revealing that better managed firms are significantly more
likely to grow. Column (9) estimates a model with Tobin’s average q as the dependent variable,
which is a forward looking measure of performance. Although this can only be implemented for
the publicly listed firms, we see again a positive and significant association with this stock market
based measure. Finally, column (10) examines bankruptcy/death and finds that better managed
firms are significantly less likely to die.
These are conditional correlations that are consistent with the MAT model, but are obviously not
to be taken as causal. However, the randomized control trial (RCT) evidence in Indian textile
firms (Bloom et al, 2013) showed that increasing WMS style management scores by one standard
deviation in management caused a 10% increase in TFP. This estimate lies between the fixed effect
estimates of column (4) and the cross sectional estimates of column (3). Other well identified
(sufficiently detailed) accounts so no performance data is available. Hence, these performance regressions use data
for all firms except privately held ones in the U.S., Canada and India.
25The empirical measure of management here, M, corresponds to the log of the managerial capital stock (lnM ) in
the theory. This seems reasonable given the evidence of Figure 3 of the log-normal distribution of the empirical score.
26Note that these correlations are not simply driven by the “Anglo-Saxon” countries, as one might suspect if the
management measures were culturally biased. We cannot reject that the coefficient on management is the same across
all countries: the F-test (p-value) on the inclusion of a full set of management*country dummies is 0.790 (0.642).
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estimates of the causal impact of management practices - such as the RCT evidence from Mexico
discussed in Bruhn, Karlan and Schoar (2016) and the management assistance natural experiment
from the Marshall plan discussed in Giorcelli (2016) - find similarly large impacts of management
practices on firm productivity.
4.2 Product Market Competition
4.2.1 Competition and management
An important implication of the management as technology model is that tougher competition is
likely to improve average management scores. To test this prediction, we estimate regressions of
the form:
Micjt = γCOMPETITIONcjt + αzit + ηt + ξcj + νicjt (5)
where zit is a vector of other firm controls (the proportion of employees with a college degree, log
firm and plant size, log firm age and noise controls), ηt denotes year dummies, ξct denotes a full set
of three digit SIC industry dummies by country, and v is an error term.
We employ three different industry measures of competition. First, we begin with the inverse
industry Lerner index measured in an industry by country by period cell. The Lerner index is
a classic measure of competition (Aghion et al, 2005), and is calculated as the median price cost
margin within an industry-country cell using all firms in the ORBIS accounting database.27 Since
profits data is not generally reported for firms in developing countries, we focus on OECD countries.
We build a time varying Lerner index using data relative to three different periods (2003-2006; 2008-
2011; 2012-2013).28 These industry by country by period variables are then correlated with the
management scores conducted over the same time periods.
As an alternative to the Lerner measure of competition, we use a measure of import penetration
(imports over apparent consumption) in the country by industry by period cell, again measured
in the same periods and for the same set of OECD countries using industry by country by year
data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD). Finally, to take into account the fact that
observed changes in import competition may not be exogenous, we build an alternative measure of
import penetration from WIOD which includes only imports from China, as these have been show
in other papers (e.g. Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen, 2015) to be overwhelmingly driven by policy
changes such as Chinese accession to the WTO and the subsequent reduction in tariffs and quotas
(e.g. the dismantling of the Multi-Fiber Agreement).
27In the simulated data we confirm that this empirical measure of the Lerner Index is highly correlated with our
consumer price sensitivity parameter, ρ. For example, the Lerner has a correlation of 0.928 with price sensitivity
across simulations in which we increase ρ in unit increments from 3 to 15.
28See the Appendix for details on the construction of the measures of competition. These roughly correspond to
blocks of time before, during and after the Great Recession/Euro Crisis. 2013 is the last full year of the ORBIS
database currently available.
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We begin by just showing the raw data in Figure 7, binning the three competition measures into
terciles and plotting the mean management score in each bin. Panel A shows this for cross sec-
tional “levels” (after subtracting the overall industry means and overall country means in both the
competition measure and the management score), revealing a robustly positively relationship for all
three competition measures. Panel B reports a similar graphic for “changes” in management over
time within a country by industry pair (i.e. subtracting the country by industry means) against
changes in competition over time, again displaying a robustly positive relationship.
In Table 4, we examine this more formally in a regression context estimating equation (5). The
dependent variable across all columns is the standardized value of the management score. Column
(1) reports the correlation between management and competition including industry by country
fixed effects, time dummies and other standard firm-level controls. Consistent with Figure 7, the
Lerner Index has a positive and significant correlation with management. The simulation model
suggests that this relationship should be stronger if we size-weight management due to better
reallocation in more competitive sectors. Column (2) does this using as a weight the share of
employment in the industry by country cell. Indeed, the coefficient on the Lerner measure rises from
0.99 to 1.75. The next four columns repeat the specifications but use import penetration, including
imports from all countries in columns (3) and (4) and just imports from China in columns (5) and
(6), as an alternative measure of competition. The pattern of results shows a larger coefficient on
the competition measures for the size-weighted regressions compared to the unweighted regressions,
consistent with the findings from using the Lerner Index.
We also considered a fourth measure of competition from our survey data: the number of rivals
as perceived by the plant manager. The advantage of this indicator is that it is available for all
countries in our survey. Empirically, the variable is also linked to improvements in management. In
a specification like column (1) the coefficient (standard error) on this measure of competition was
0.033 (0.017) on a sample of 14,305 observations including all countries with management data,
and 0.059 (0.022) on the sample of OECD countries overlapping with the one used in Table 4
(8,414 observations as there are a few some missing values on the number of competitors variable).
The disadvantage of the number of rivals measure is that it is not tightly linked to the theory
simulations.29
Overall, the results suggest that higher competition is associated with significant improvements in
management, and the magnitude of the coefficient is larger when we weight the regressions by size.
In terms of magnitudes a one standard deviation change in the Lerner index in the unweighted
regression is associated with a 0.06 of a standard deviation change in management, compared to
0.02 using the import penetration measure and 0.05 using Chinese imports. The equivalent numbers
for the weighted regressions are 0.11, 0.05 and 0.05.30
29Although falls in barriers to entry will tend to increase the number of firms in the MAT model, increases in
consumer sensitivity to price can lead to an equilibrium reduction in the number of firms.
30To check whether the difference between the weighted and the unweighted results was significant, we compared
the distribution of the estimated coefficients with and without weights bootstrapping with 500 replications. The
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4.2.2 Competition and reallocation towards better managed firms
Another way to confirm the reallocative impact of competition predicted by the MAT model is to
consider how factors that reduce the degree of competition reduce the covariance between manage-
ment practices and firm size, implying γ < 0 in the following equation:
FirmSizeit = γ (M ∗ COMPETITION)it + δ1Mit + δ2COMPETITION i + δ3xijt + νijt (6)
The simplest method of testing this idea is to use countries grouped into regions to proxy competi-
tive frictions, as it is likely that competition is stronger in some regions (e.g. the U.S.) than others
(e.g. southern Europe).
Column (1) of Table 5 reports the results of a regression of firm employment on the average
management score and a set of industry, year and country dummies.31 The results indicate that
increasing a firm’s management score by one standard deviation is associated with an extra 183
workers. In column (2) we allow the management coefficient to vary by region, with the U.S. as the
omitted base. The negative coefficients on the interactions indicate that that there is a stronger
relationship between size and management in the U.S. compared to other regions. This difference
is significant for Africa, Latin America and southern Europe, but not for Asia or northern Europe.
A one standard deviation increase in management is associated with 268 extra employees in the
U.S. but only 68 (= 268.4 - 199.5) extra workers in southern Europe.32 These results suggest that
reallocation is stronger in the U.S. than in the other countries, which is consistent with the findings
on productivity in Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2013) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
We also investigate explicit measures of market-friction variables that can reduce competition. In
columns (3) to (5) of Table 5 we use country-wide measures of employment regulation from the
OECD and trade costs from the World Bank. Both of these reduce the covariance between firm size
and management practices. Finally in column (6) we use the more detailed country by industry
measures of tariffs from Feenstra and Romalis (2012) in deviations from their country and industry
mean, and again find a significant negative interaction. This implies that within a sector (like
steel), countries with higher tariffs (such as Brazil) will allocate less activity to better managed
firms than those with lower tariffs (such as the U.K.).
weighted coefficients were larger than the unweighted coefficients 84% of the times for the Lerner index, 76% of the
times with the import penetration variable, and 52% of the times using imports from China.
31This is the measure of firm size reported by the plant manager. For a multinational this may be ambiguous as the
plant manager may report the global multinational size which is not necessarily closely related to the management
practices of the plant we survey. Consequently, Table 5 drops multinationals and their subsidiaries, but we show
robustness of this procedure below.
32These results are for covariances based on size. Using a dynamic version of this moment - the covariance between
employment growth and management - generates qualitatively similar results. For example, re-running column (2)
using the growth (rather than the level) of employment also has negative interactions on all the regional interactions.
For example, a one standard deviation increase in management in the U.S. raises sales growth by 6.9% compared to
a (significantly lower) 0.5% faster growth in Asia from a similar increase in management.
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Taken as a whole, these findings on competition appear very consistent with the predictions of our
MAT model.
4.3 Age
Examining the third prediction from MAT - the relationship between firm age and management -
is complicated by the fact that the “date of incorporation” information in company accounts refers
to the year in which the company was formed, even if this is due to a merger or acquisition.33
Consequently, we turn to a complementary management database, the Management and Organiza-
tional Practices (MOPS) survey, which has more accurate age data based on plant age rather than
firm age.34 MOPS is a plant-level survey with management questions that we helped design with
very similar questions to those in our standard telephone survey. Figure 8 shows strong evidence
that the average management score is higher in older cohorts of plants, and that the variance of
management scores is lower. This relationship is particularly strong when comparing plants who
have been in existence for five or less years with their older counterparts. This closely matches the
predictions from the simulation model, in which the exit of establishments with low management
draws after birth increases the average management score and reduces the management variation
(see Figure 4).35
4.4 Other predictions from the MAT model - the price of management
There are other rich predictions from MAT. One obvious implication is that managerial capital
should fall as its price increases. But how can we measure this price? It is plausible that the supply
of highly educated workers is a complement to managerial ability, especially from institutions
that supply managerial education (e.g. Gennaioli et al, 2013). To examine this idea, we used
GIS software to geocode the latitude and longitude of every plant in our database and performed a
similar exercise for every college and business school using the UNESCO Higher Education Database
(Feng, 2013) which records he location of every university and business school in the world down
to the zipcode level. We then calculated the driving times to the nearest university/business school
for each of our plants.
The WMS management score significantly increases the closer the plant is to a leading university
or business school (see Table A6). This is true even controlling for population density, regional
33For example, a company like GSK is denoted as formed in 2001 when Glaxo Wellcome merged with Smithkline-
Beecham, even though Glaxo-Wellcome has a history dating back to late Nineteenth Century (Jason Nathan and
Company, started in 1873, merged with Burroughs Wellcome and Company, started by Henry Wellcome and Silas
Burroughs in 1880).
34Plant age in the Census is measured from the first year of existence in the Census/IRS Business Registry, which
is built from social security and income tax records.
35MOPS was also linked to productivity data in the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and Census of Manufactur-
ing. (Bloom et al, 2016) show that we obtain similar results on the positive connection between higher plant level
management scores and performance as shown in Table 3 above, and the positive correlation of management with
competition as shown in Table 4 above.
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dummies, weather conditions, distance to the coast, and a host of other variables. The proportion
of more educated employees and managers also significantly increases with proximity to a university
(as one would expect if there are mobility frictions and graduates are more likely to find employment
in a nearby firm). So a plausible reason for the positive correlation of management with universities
is through the supply of skills, reducing the cost of investing in managerial capital.
4.5 Management as Design
The predictions of the Management as a Technology model on performance, competition, age and
price are all consistent with the results from the WMS and MOPS management datasets. Our
extremely stylized version of the Management as Design model does less well. This Design model
does successfully predict the dispersion of management (compare Figure 3 with Figure 6 Panel
A) and the falling dispersion of management with age (compare Figure 8 light bars with Figure 6
Panel C). However, the predictions of a non-monotonic relationship between firm performance and
management are rejected (compare Figure A2 with Figure 6 Panel D) as is the flat relationship
between management and competition (compare Figure 7 with Figure 6 Panel B) and management
and age (compare Figure 8 dark bars with Figure 6 Panel C).
One set of results that is instead consistent with the Design approach relates to the contingency of
specific types of management practices on different industry characteristics. More specifically, the
Design approach suggests we might expect sectors that make intensive use of tangible fixed capital to
specialize more in monitoring/targets management, whereas human capital intensive sectors focus
more on people/incentives management. This is indeed what we tend to observe when we correlate
our management data with four digit U.S. industry data on the capital-labor ratio (NBER) and
R&D per employee (NSF), as shown in Panel A of Table 6.36 Although both people management
(column 1) and monitoring/targets management (column 2) are increasing in capital intensity, the
relationship is much stronger for monitoring & targets, as shown when we regress the relative
variable (people/incentives score minus monitoring/targets score) on capital intensity in column
(3). The opposite is true for R&D intensity as shown in the next three columns: in high tech
industries, people management is much more important. These findings are robust to including
them together with skills in the final three columns. As an alternative empirical strategy in Panel
B, we use country by industry specific values of these variables from the EU-KLEMS dataset. In
these specifications we are using the country-specific variation in capital and R&D intensity within
the same industry. The results are qualitatively similar to Panel A - capital intensive industries
have higher monitoring/target management practices, while R&D intensive industries have higher
people management practices scores, consistent with a basic Design model.
In summary, MAT appears to provide the best all around fit for the data, particularly in terms
of firm performance. We will use the implications of this model in the next section to calculate
36This is implicitly assuming that the U.S. values are picking up underlying technological differences between
industries that are true across countries.
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what share of cross-country differences in TFP can be attributed to differences in management
practices. However, there is some support for the Design model in terms of contingent management
styles, suggesting that a hybrid model could offer a slightly better fit but at the expense of greater
complexity.
5 Accounting for cross-country TFP differences with Manage-
ment
We turn to a long-standing question in economics, stretching back to at least Walker (1887), of
how much of the variation in national and firm performance can be accounted for by differences in
management practices? We begin at the country level by defining an aggregate country management
index and decomposing this into a within firm and between firm component following Olley and
Pakes (1996) as:
M =
∑
i
Misi =
∑
i
[(
Mi −Mi
)
(si − si)
]
+Mi = OP +Mi
where Mi is the management score for firm i, si is a size-weight (the firm’s share of employment
in the country), M is the unweighted average management score across firms and OP indicates the
“Olley Pakes” covariance term,
∑
i
[(
Mi −Mi
)
(si − si)
]
. The OP term simply divides manage-
ment into a within and a between/reallocation term. Comparing any two countries k and k’, the
difference in weighted scores can be decomposed into the difference in reallocation and unweighted
management scores:
Mk −Mk′ =
(
OP k −OP k′
)
+
(
Mi
k −Mk′i
)
A deficit in aggregate management is composed of a difference in the reallocation effect
(
OP k −OP k′
)
and the average unweighted firm management scores
(
Mi
k −Mk′i
)
. Note that one could replace
Management by TFP or labor productivity for a more conventional analysis.
Table 7 reports the results of this decomposition (more details in Appendix B) using the U.S. as
the base country as it has the highest management scores. In column (1) we present the employ-
ment share-weighted management scores (M) in z-scores, so all differences can be read in standard
deviations. These differ from those presented earlier in Figure 1 because we have dropped multina-
tionals (to focus on clean national differences) and size-weighted the management scores. In column
(2) we show the unweighted average management score (Mi), and in column (3) the Olley Pakes
covariance term. From this we can see that, for example, the leading country - the U.S. - has a
size-weighted management score of 0.90, which is split almost half in between a reallocation effect
(0.40) and an unweighted average management score effect (0.50). Thus, the U.S. not only has
the highest unweighted management score but it also has a high degree of reallocation as discussed
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above in sub-section 4.2.37
We next calculate each country’s management gap with the U.S. Column (4) does this for the
overall management gap and column (5) reports the share of this gap arising from differences in
reallocation. These results are also presented graphically in Figure 8, which shows that reallocation
accounts for a non-trivial fraction of the management gap in just about all countries.
We can push this analysis further by examining how much management could explain cross country
differences in TFP. Column (6) of Table 7 contains the country’s TFP gap with the U.S. using the
latest Penn World Tables (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2015).38 Following the randomized
control trial (Bloom et al, 2013) and non-experimental evidence in Table 3, we assume that a one
standard deviation increase in management causes a 10% increase in TFP. For example, we can
estimate that improving Greece’s weighted average management score to that of the U.S. (a 1.3
standard deviation increase) would increase Greek TFP by 13%, about a third of the 37.5% TFP
gap between Greece and the U.S. Column (7) contains similar calculations for the other countries.
Overall, on average 30% of the cross country gap in TFP appears to be management related (see
base of column (7)).39 This fraction varies a lot between countries. In general we account for a
smaller fraction of the TFP gap between the U.S. and low income countries like Zambia (6.2%),
Ghana (9.7%), and Tanzania (12%), which is likely to be because these countries have much greater
problems than just management quality. We account for a larger fraction of the TFP gap between
the U.S. and richer countries like Sweden (43.9%), Italy (48.9%) and France (52.3%). Figure A4
graphically illustrates this, showing that more developed countries have a higher share of their TFP
gap accounted for by differences in management.
In Appendix B we consider a wide variety of robustness tests of these basic findings, and these
are summarized in Table 8. Row 1 gives the baseline result from Table 7. Row 2 drops pre-2006
data and row 3 drops all panel observations apart from the entry year. We change the selection
equation underlying the sample weights used to correct for non-random response by using only size
(dropping listing status, age and industry dummies) in row 4. Row 5 gives the results without
any selection correction, Row 6 includes multinationals, and Row 7 uses an alternative measure of
size, using an index of weighted inputs (capital and labor). We were concerned that we did not
run our survey on very small (under 50 workers) and very large firms (over 5,000 workers), so we
37Interestingly, these results are broadly consistent with Bartelsman et al (2013) who conducted a similar analysis
for productivity on a smaller number of countries but with larger samples of firms. Although the countries we
examine do not perfectly overlap, the ranking in Bartelsman et al (2013) also has the U.S. at the top with Germany
second and then France. Britain does somewhat better in our analysis, being above France, but our data is more
recent (2006-2014 compared to their 1992-2001) and Bartelsman et al (2013) note that Britain’s reallocation position
improved in the 2000s (their footnote 9).
38We used the latest information from 2011, but qualitative results are stable if we take an average over a larger
number of years. When data was missing we impute using values in Jones and Romer (2010).
39For the seven countries where it is possible to calculate manufacturing TFP, the correlation with whole economy
TFP is 0.94. The average proportion of the manufacturing TFP gap accounted for by management in these countries
was 32.6%. We also find that our manufacturing management scores are highly correlated with the management
scores in other sectors like retail, healthcare, schools and government services (see Chong et al. 2014), so that the
manufacturing management score appears to be a good measure of overall national management quality.
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repeated our analysis on a sub-sample of countries where we have detailed information on the firm
size distribution in the population. Knowing the full size distribution allows us to make a selection
correction for the fact we only observe medium sized firms (Appendix B.2). Row 8 has the baseline
results on these countries and row 8 implements the correction.
Although the exact quantitative findings change across Table 8, the qualitative results are very
robust to all these alternative modeling details. The fraction of the TFP gap explained by manage-
ment is non-trivial, ranging from 20% to 50% (column (5)). The correlation of relative management
gaps between the baseline estimates and alternatives estimation techniques (column (3)) never falls
below 0.85 and the correlation of the fraction of TFP explained by management (column (6)) with
baseline results never falls below 0.89.
We can also look at the within country/cross-firm dimension for those countries where we have de-
tailed productivity data. For example, the average industry TFPR spread between the 90th and 10th
percentiles is 90% in U.S. manufacturing (Syverson, 2004), so with our spread of management (2.7
standard deviations between the 90-10) we can account for 30% of the TFP spread (=(2.7*0.1)/0.9).
If instead we examine TFPQ using the results from Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) we ob-
tain a similar share of dispersion potentially accounted for by management.40 Similar calculations
for the U.K. show that 38% of the 90-10 TFPR spread is management-related.
6 Conclusions
Economists, business people and many policymakers have long believed that management practices
are an important element in productivity. We collect original cross sectional and panel data on
over 11,000 firms across 34 countries to provide robust firm-level measures of management in
an internationally comparable way. We detail a formal model where our management measures
have “technological” elements. In the model, management enters as another capital stock in the
production function and raises output. We allow entrants to have an idiosyncratic endowment of
managerial ability, but also to endogenously change management over time (alongside other factor
inputs, some of which are also costly to adjust like non-managerial capital). We show how the
qualitative predictions of this model are consistent with the data, as well as presenting structural
estimates to recover some key parameters (such as the cost of adjustment and depreciation rates
of managerial capital).
Our empirical findings are easy to summarize. First, firms who scored more highly in our manage-
ment quality index improved firm performance in both non-experimental and experimental settings.
Second, in the cross section and panel dimension, firms in sectors facing greater competition were
more likely to have better management practices. Part of this competition effect is due to stronger
40While Foster et al. (2008) do not provide data on the 90-10 spread for TFPQ in their data they do provide the
standard deviation which is 0.67 (compared to 0.56 for TFPR) which for a normal distribution would imply a 90-10
spread of 95%, implying management would again account for about 30% of the dispersion.
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reallocation effects, whereby the better managed firms are rewarded with more market share in some
countries compared to others. Third, as cohorts of firms age, the average level of management in-
creases and dispersion decreases (due to selection). Fourth, the falls in the price of management
as proxied by increases in the supply the skills (e.g. through universities and business schools) are
associated with higher management scores. Finally, we use the model to show that management
accounts for about 30% of a nation’s TFP deficit with the U.S. across countries.
There are many directions to take this work. It would be useful to examine the determinants of
management practices in greater detail. We have focused on market-based incentives, but informa-
tional frictions and coordination may be equally if not more important. Gibbons and Henderson
(2012), for example, argue that the need to coordinate a multitude of dispersed agents within a
firm is critical.41
We would also like to test another implication of the management as a technology model, which is
that if management is at least partly non-rival, it should exhibit spillovers as firms learn from each
other. Thus, there will be positive effects of management on those neighbors who can learn best
practice. This is analogous to the R&D or peer effects literature, and techniques can be borrowed
from this body of work as a test of the alternative model, which we leave for future work. Finally,
while we focus on the evidence supporting our “Management as a Technology” interpretation, our
contingency results support a design channel too. So it would be good to develop a richer model
encompassing both the design and technology approaches. We hope our work opens up a research
agenda on why there appear to be so many badly managed firms and what factors can help improve
management, and thus increase the aggregate wealth of nations.
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Figure 1: Average Management Scores by Country
Note: Unweighted average management scores; # interviews in right column (total = 15,489); all waves pooled (2004-2014)
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Figure 3: Management Spreads: Data and Simulation
Notes: The left plot is the management distribution for our entire sample of 15,489 firm surveys. The right plot is
the histogram for a simulation of 15,489 simulated firm-years, where management has been logged and scaled
onto a 1 to 5 range. Replication file on http://web.stanford.edu/~nbloom/MAT.zip
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Elasticity of Competition
Notes: Results from using our estimated MAT model to simulate 5,000 firms per year in the steady state.
Plots log(management) in the simulation data normalized onto a 1 to 5 scale, and log(sales). Competition
is index by demand elasticity (ρ=5) in baseline. Dark Blue bar is unweighted mean across firms, Light Red
bar is weighted by firm size (employees). Replication file on http://web.stanford.edu/~nbloom/MAT.zip
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TABLE 1: CALIBRATED PARAMETERS FROM THE LITERATURE 
Parameter Symbol value Rationale 
Capital – output elasticity a 0.3 NIPA factor share 
Labor – output elasticity b 0.6 NIPA factor share 
Management – output elasticity c 0.1 Bloom et al (2013) 
Demand elasticity ρ 5 Bartelsman et al (2013) 
AR(1) parameter on ln(TFP) ρA 0.885 Cooper and Haltiwanger(2006) 
Standard deviation of ln(TFP) σA 0.453 Cooper and Haltiwanger(2006)* 
Discount Factor β 1/1.1 Standard 10% interest rate 
Capital depreciation rate δK 10% Standard accounting assumption 
Capital resale loss ϕK 50% Ramey and Shapiro (2001) 
Notes: Fixed cost of production is normalized to 100 and mean of ln(TFP) is normalized to 1. 
* Assumes measurement error on measured TFP has the same variance as true TFP as estimated in Bloom et al (2013).
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATED PARAMETERS USING SIMULATED METHOD OF MOMENTS 
PANEL A: PARAMETER ESTIMATES FROM SMM 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Depreciation rate of management δM 0.133 (0.055) 
Adjustment cost parameter for management γM 0.207 (0.065) 
Adjustment cost parameter for capital γK 0.189 (0.042) 
Sunk cost of entry κ 165.9 (6.78) 
PANEL B: MOMENTS USED IN SMM ESTIMATES 
Parameter Simulated Value Data Value 
Standard deviation of 5 year management growth 0.559 0.564 
Standard deviation of 5 year sales growth 0.936 0.948 
Standard deviation of 5 year capital growth 0.883 0.875 
Annual Exit rate 3.88% 3.89% 
Notes: These are the parameters we estimate using the model (see text). Calibrated parameters from Table 1. Estimation by SMM on the management- accounting panel dataset of 
up to 4907 firms. Standard errors generated by moment block-bootstrap and moment derivatives taken around the estimated parameter values. 
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TABLE 3: PERFORMANCE REGRESSIONS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent 
variable 
Ln 
(Sales) 
Ln 
(Sales) 
Ln 
(Sales) 
Ln 
(Sales) 
Ln 
(Sales) 
Ln 
(Employees) 
Profitability 
(ROCE, %) 
5 year Sales 
growth 
Ln(Tobin 
Q) 
Death 
(%) 
Specification OLS OLS OLS OLS Olley-Pakes OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit 
Management 0.356*** 0.159*** 0.154*** 0.035*** 0.231*** 0.402*** 1.005*** 0.043*** 0.030** -0.090** 
(z-score) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.012) (0.031) (0.013) (0.296) (0.012) (0.015) (0.041) 
Ln(Employees) 0.873*** 0.623*** 0.623*** 0.427*** 0.524*** 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.028) (0.060) (0.025) 
Ln(Capital) 0.306*** 0.295*** 0.186*** 0.386*** 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.042) (0.098) 
General 
controls 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No Yes No No No No No No 
Observations 12,146 10,900 8,877 8,877 6,433 24,501 12,578 11,291 6,572 7,507 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes 5% significance and * denotes 10% significance. All columns estimated by OLS (except columns (5) and (10)) with standard errors in 
parentheses under coefficients and clustered by firm. Column (5) uses the Olley-Pakes estimator. Column (10) uses probit estimation. Columns (1) to (9) are run on the combined full management-
accounting dataset panel from 2004 to 2014. Column (10) is run on the 2011 cross-section using firms surveyed up until 2010, with this cut-off defined to provide 4 years to measure exit (firms can 
take up to 4 years to show up as dead in accounting data). Columns (3) and (4) restrict to firms which were surveyed in at least two different years. Column (5) restricts to firms with lagged capital 
to generate investment data (the proxy variable in Olley-Pakes). “Management” is the firm’s normalized z-score of management (the z-score of the average z-scores of the 18 management questions). 
“Profitability” is “Return on Capital Employed” (ROCE) and “5 year Sales growth” is the 5-year growth of sales defined as the difference of current and 5-year lagged logged sales. All columns 
include a full set of country, three digit industry and time dummies. “Death” is the probability of exit by 2011 (sample mean is 2.4%). “Tobin’s Q”   is the stock-market equity and book value of 
debt value of the firm normalized by the book value of the firm, available for the publicly listed firms only. “General controls” comprises of firm age and the proportion of employees with college 
degrees (from the survey), plus a set of survey noise controls which are interviewer dummies, the seniority and tenure of the manager who responded, the duration of the interviews and an indicator 
of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. 
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TABLE 4: COMPETITION AND MANAGEMENT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: Management (z-scored) 
(1-Lerner) 0.990*** 1.751*** 
(0.366) (0.443) 
Import Penetration 0.398** 0.830** 
(0.170) (0.327) 
Import Penetration – from China only 2.090** 2.204* 
(0.972) (1.137) 
Observations 8,630 8,630 8,630 8,630 8,630 8,630 
Size- weight the regressions? No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes:  ** indicates significance at 5% level and * at the 10%. The dependent variable in all columns is the z-score of the average z-scores of the 18 management 
questions. OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the industry by country by period cell in all 
columns. “Lerner” is the median gross price-cost margin across all firms (from the ORBIS population) in the firm’s three digit SIC industry by country by 
period cell; “Import penetration” is the value of all imports divided by apparent consumption (total production + imports - exports) in the plant’s ISIC Rev3 
industry by country by period cell.  “Import penetration – from China only” is the value of all imports originating from China divided by apparent consumption 
in the plant’s ISIC Rev3 industry by country by period cell. All columns include only firms located in OECD countries and include all data collected across 
2004-2014 survey waves. Industry is defined at the 3 digit SIC level in columns (1)-(2), and at the ISIC Rev3 level in columns (3)-(6). All columns include 
ln(firm employment) and ln(plant employment), plus a full set of country by industry dummies and general controls (firm age and the proportion of employees 
with college degrees (from the survey), a set of survey noise controls which are interviewer dummies, the seniority and tenure of the manager who responded, 
the duration of the interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer). Columns (1) and (2) include a variable measuring 
the log of the number of firms used to build the Lerner index in the country-industry-period cell. Columns (3)-(6) include the variable measuring apparent 
consumption in the country-industry-period cell (the denominator of the import penetration variable) in levels. Employment weights are defined with respect to 
total employment in the industry (3 digit SIC) by country cell. 
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TABLE 5: REALLOCATION TOWARDS BETTER MANAGED FIRMS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Variable: Employees Employees Employees Employees Employees Employees 
Management (M) 182.6*** 268.4*** 294.83*** 285.09*** 463.23*** 289.397*** 
   (US is the omitted base) (20.8) (40.1) (77.22) (45.53) (105.09) (71.538) 
Management*Employment  -56.73* -59.21* 
Protection (country level) (30.46) (30.66) 
Management *Trade costs  -0.10*** -0.16*** 
(country level) (0.03) (0.05) 
Management *Tariff Levels -45.141* 
(country*industry) (24.653) 
MNG*Africa -144.6*** 
(52.1) 
MNG*Americas -96.3** 
(43.9) 
MNG*(Other EU) -46.6 
(58.5) 
MNG*(South EU) -199.5*** 
(46.1) 
MNG*Asia -64.3 
(52.3) 
Observations 8,991 8,991 
7,272 8,918 7,272 8,087 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1%, 5% (**) or 10% (*) level. Management*US is the omitted base in columns (1) and (2). Estimation by OLS with 
standard errors clustered by firm. All columns include year, country, three SIC digit industry dummies, and general controls (firm age and the proportion of 
employees with college degrees (from the survey), plus a set of survey noise controls which are interviewer dummies, the seniority and tenure of the manager who 
responded, the duration of the interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer). The sample is domestic firms only (i.e. 
no foreign or domestic multinationals). “M” is z-score of the average z-scores of the 18 management questions. “Sales growth” is one year ahead logarithmic 
change. “Employment Protection” is the “Difficulty of Hiring” index is from World Bank (from 1 to 100). “Trade Cost” is World Bank measure of the costs to 
export in the country (in US$). Tariffs are specific to the industry and country (MFN rates) kindly supplied by John Romalis (see Feenstra and Romalis, 2012). 
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TABLE 6: MANAGEMENT BY DESIGN - STYLES DIFFER DEPENDING ON ENVIRONMENT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
People 
Management 
Monitoring 
& Targets 
Relative 
People 
People 
Management 
Monitoring 
&Targets 
Relative 
People 
People 
Management 
Monitoring 
&Targets 
Relative 
People 
(P) (MT) (P-MT) (P) (MT) (P-MT) (P) (MT) (P-MT) 
Panel A: Using US Four digit industry  (NBER, NSF) 
ln(K/L) 0.018 0.107*** -0.118*** -0.000 0.096*** -0.125*** 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) 
R&D Intensity 0.136** 0.041 0.114 0.031 -0.125* 0.201*** 
(0.064) (0.087) (0.089) (0.062) (0.072) (0.074) 
ln(%degree) 0.139*** 0.123*** 0.011 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) 
Observations 13,681 13,681 13,681 13,681 13,681 13,681 13,681 13,681 13,681 
Panel B: Two-Digit industry by county specific value (KLEMS, OECD) 
ln(K/L) -0.044 0.039 -0.104** -0.062 0.038 -0.126*** 
(0.040) (0.032) (0.040) (0.040) (0.034) (0.037) 
R&D Intensity 0.496 0.100 0.476* 0.584 -0.004 0.721** 
(0.358) (0.260) (0.249) (0.413) (0.254) (0.306) 
ln(%degree) 0.132*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.019) 
Observations 4,855 4,855 4,855 4,855 4,855 4,855 4,855 4,855 4,855 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significant, ** denotes 5% significance and * denotes 10% significance. All dependent variables are z-scores of average z-scores of the underlying 
questions. “People management” is the index built using all management questions between 13 to 18 and “Monitoring and targets” are all the remaining questions.  All 
columns estimated by OLS with standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. All columns control for two-digit SIC industry dummies, country and year dummies, ln(firm 
employment) and ln(plant employment), plus a full set of general controls (firm age and the proportion of employees with college degrees (from the survey), plus a set of survey 
noise controls which are interviewer dummies, the seniority and tenure of the manager who responded, the duration of the interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the 
information as coded by the interviewer).  In Panel A the capital-labor ratio is taken from the NBER Bartelsman-Grey dataset and R&D intensity is business R&D divided by 
employment from NSF. Both capital-labor and R&D intensity are at the four digit level for the US and used across all countries (so no country-specific variation). In Panel B 
the capital-labor ratio is measured at the two digit by country level from the EU KLEMs dataset and R&D/Value added is from the OECD STAN/ANBERD. EU-KLEMS is 
only available for a restricted set of countries (Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, UK and US) hence the smaller sample size. Standard errors are clustered at the four 
digit level in Panel A and two-digit industry by country level in Panel B.
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TABLE 7: DECOMPOSITION OF CROSS COUNTRY TFP AND MANAGEMENT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
country 
Weighted 
Manage
ment 
Un-
weighted 
Manage
ment 
Covar- 
iance 
Mng. 
Gap vs. 
US 
% 
Reallo- 
cation 
TFP Gap 
with US 
% TFP 
due 
to Man-
agement 
US 0.90 0.40 0.50 0 0 
Japan 0.57 0.26 0.31 -0.33 56.64 -0.34 9.71 
Sweden 0.55 0.38 0.17 -0.35 93.39 -0.08 43.49 
Germany 0.36 0.18 0.19 -0.54 57.91 -0.19 28.72 
Canada 0.27 0.04 0.24 -0.63 41.92 -0.13 48.64 
UK 0.10 -0.11 0.21 -0.81 35.88 -0.15 55.34 
Singapore 0.07 -0.23 0.29 -0.84 24.69 
Poland 0.04 -0.20 0.23 -0.86 30.69 -0.22 39.26 
France -0.01 -0.19 0.18 -0.91 35.29 -0.17 52.52 
Mexico -0.07 -0.30 0.23 -0.97 28.21 -0.32 30.20 
Australia -0.08 -0.18 0.10 -0.98 40.24 -0.19 51.56 
Italy -0.08 -0.18 0.10 -0.98 41.05 -0.20 48.90 
Spain -0.14 -0.50 0.36 -1.04 13.19 -0.27 39.03 
Vietnam -0.18 -0.50 0.32 -1.08 16.42 
Chile -0.19 -0.48 0.29 -1.09 18.81 -0.37 29.48 
Turkey -0.20 -0.29 0.09 -1.10 36.92 
Portugal -0.22 -0.43 0.20 -1.13 26.27 -0.41 27.41 
Colombia -0.23 -0.51 0.28 -1.13 19.28 -0.66 17.21 
Brazil -0.26 -0.51 0.25 -1.16 21.20 -0.79 14.63 
Ireland -0.29 -0.55 0.26 -1.19 20.33 
China -0.31 -0.41 0.11 -1.21 32.49 -0.90 13.44 
NZ -0.33 -0.48 0.15 -1.23 28.44 -0.24 51.00 
India -0.34 -0.52 0.17 -1.25 26.07 -0.73 17.20 
Greece -0.40 -0.52 0.12 -1.30 29.09 -0.35 37.48 
Kenya -0.40 -0.55 0.14 -1.30 27.26 -1.39 9.32 
Argentina -0.41 -0.55 0.14 -1.31 27.74 -0.38 34.84 
Myanmar -0.45 -0.78 0.33 -1.35 12.58 
Nigeria -0.61 -0.67 0.06 -1.51 28.85 
Tanzania -0.67 -1.04 0.37 -1.57 7.96 -1.34 11.74 
Nicaragua -0.71 -0.89 0.19 -1.61 19.44 
Ethiopia -0.85 -1.05 0.20 -1.75 17.09 
Zambia -0.99 -1.05 0.06 -1.89 23.00 -3.04 6.22 
Ghana -1.03 -1.04 0.01 -1.94 25.49 -2.00 9.69 
Mzmbique -1.46 -1.60 0.13 -2.36 15.47 -1.10 21.40 
Average -1.14 29.68 29.94 
Notes: Colum (1) is employment share weighted management z-score. Column (2) is the unweighted score and Column (3) is 
the management-employment covariance. Column (4) is the weighted management score in column (1) relative to US . Column 
(5) is the proportion of relative weighted management score in column (1) due to reallocation. The country’s TFP relative to 
the US in column (6) is from Penn World Tables version 8.1. (Feenstra et al, 2015) available at 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/v81/the_next_generation_of_the_penn_world_table.pdf. Column (6) is the fraction 
of the TFP gap with the US in column (6) that is due to the weighted relative management score in column (1). We assume a 
one standard deviation increase in the management score causes a 10% increase in TFP (using Table 3 and Bloom et al, 2013). 
All scores are adjusted for nonrandom selection into the management survey (see text). Only domestic firms used in these 
calculations (i.e. multinationals and their subsidiaries are dropped).  
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TABLE 8: ROBUSTNESS OF DECOMPOSITIONS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Relative to US size-weighted Management Score Share of TFP gap with US accounted for by size-
weighted management 
Observations Mean 
Correlation 
with baseline 
Observations Mean 
Correlation 
with baseline 
1. Baseline 33 -1.14 1 25 29.90 1 
2. Drop pre-2006 data 33 -1.22 0.998 25 33.10 0.992 
3. Drop panel firms after
first year 
33 -1.17 0.995 
25 31.55 0.991 
4. Just size in selection
equation 
33 -0.99 0.996 
25 24.80 0.985 
5. No Selection Correction 33 -0.86 0.984 25 19.97 0.873 
6. Include multi-nationals
33 -1.02 0.854 25 24.43 0.888 
7. Weighted inputs as size
measure 33 -0.98 0.990 
25 34.48 0.960 
8. Include firms outside
50,5000 (baseline) 13 -0.86 1 
12 41.16 1 
9. Include firms outside
50,5000 (corrected) 13 -1.08 0.925 
12 49.98 0.968 
Notes: This Table shows key statistics for alternative ways of dealing with potential sample selection concerns. The baseline in row 1 summarizes results in Table 7 where we 
correct for country-specific sample selection (modelled from a first stage probit of whether an eligible firm responded as a function of ln(employment size), whether the firm 
was publicly listed, and industry dummies). We then weight observations by the inverse of the probability of being in the sample.   Row 2 drops all data before 2006. Row 3 
drops all observations in the panel after the first year the firm is drawn in the sample. Row 4 uses only ln(employment) in the probit for sample selection. Row 5 uses the raw 
data, i.e. does not correct for selection. Row 6 includes multinationals (the baseline results only use domestic firms) and includes a foreign multinational dummy in the selection 
equation. Row 7 uses weighted inputs (capital and labor) as a size measure rather than just labor. Our sampling frame uses firms with between 50 and 5,000 employees. For a 
sub-sample of countries we know the fraction of employment this covers differs across countries (see Appendix B for details) and can use this to impute management in the 
“missing” part of the size distribution. We show the results of this in rows 8 and 9. Since this correction can only be done for the sub-sample of countries where we know the 
full firm size distribution for manufacturing, row 8 shows what the baseline results look like for this sub-sample of countries and row 9 presents the corrected results. “Correlation 
with baseline” is the correlation of the relevant (country level) variable with the baseline values in row 1. The correlation with size weighted management is in column (3) and 
the correlation of the fraction of country TFP accounted for by management is in column (6).
A APPENDIX: DATA
We overview the datasets in this Appendix. More information on an earlier version of the dataset
can be found in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012b) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). More
information on the management survey in general (including datasets, methods and an online
benchmarking tool) is available on http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/.
A.1 Firm-level Accounting Databases
Our manufacturing firm sampling frame
We focus on medium sized manufacturing firms in this paper, so to conduct our surveys we would
ideally draw a sampling frame from a business registry of firms. Unfortunately, the names of these
firms in administrative data from business registers (where it exists) are usually confidential. Three
exceptions were Chile, Colombia and Singapore. In Chile we worked directly with the government,
so it was possible to use the confidential business register data to phone firms - the Industrial
Annual Survey Sample of Firms (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Annual - ENIA), which covers all
manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees. We used a similar model in Colombia, working
with the Business Ministry and World Bank. In Singapore the Ministry of Trade and Industry ran
the survey (with our training) using their population business register.42
For other countries we use publicly available data sources.43 Our main sampling frame for all other
countries was based on various accounting databases supplied by Bureau van Dijk (BVD), a private
sector organization that seeks to compile accounting information on companies from all over the
world. BVD ORBIS has names, industry, addresses, status (e.g. active or bankrupt), and account-
ing information such as employment and sales. ORBIS is constructed from a range of sources,
primarily the national registries of companies (such as Companies House in the U.K.). The full
sources for the sampling frame are listed in column (3) of Table A2.44 In some countries we were
concerned about incomplete coverage by ORBIS so we supplemented it with other sources. We also
used Dun & Bradstreet for Australia and New Zealand. In India we use CMIE Firstsource 2005.45
42Unlike in Chile and Colombia, we were not able to obtain the characteristics of the non-responders in the sampling
frame from the Singaporean government due to confidentiality reasons.
43There is usually a fee to be paid for access to the data compiled in an easy to use form, but the names and
addresses of the firms are given in this data (unlike administrative government data where names are not revealed)
as they are in the public domain.
44The firm-level databases underlying ORBIS are sometimes packaged under different names in different regions
of the world by BVD (for a given country, the same firms are covered but sometimes with more fields of data). For
example, in Europe the firm database is called AMADEUS (France, Germany, Greece, Great Britain, Italy, Ireland,
Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Turkey); in North America it is called ICARUS (U.S. and
Canada) and in parts of Asia it is called ORIANA (China, Japan). Other countries where we simply used ORBIS
include Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Viet Nam. In Table A2 we simply refer to all of these as ORBIS as this is the
same overall list of firms.
45CMIE is constructed from the Registry of Companies in India. Icarus is constructed from the Dun & Bradstreet
database, which is a private database of over 5 million US trading locations built up from credit records, business
telephone directories and direct research. Oriana is constructed from Huaxia credit in China and Teikoku Database
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Low income countries pose a particular challenge, as there is generally no well maintained business
register to draw upon. We used a larger variety of data sources to construct sampling frames for
these countries complementing ORBIS with country specific “enterprise maps” put together by
researchers such as John Sutton at the London School of Economics’ International Growth Cen-
tre (IGC) who worked with local consultants. For full details on the African sampling frame, see
Lemos and Scur (2015). Briefly, in addition to ORBIS and the enterprise maps in Ethiopia (Sut-
ton and Kellow, 2010), we also used trade directories and the online yellow pages; in Ghana we
supplemented Sutton and Kpentey (2012) with the Ghana Free Zones Board and Business Ghana
Directory; in Kenya we supplemented ORBIS with the Kenya Association of Manufacturers; in
Mozambique we supplemented Sutton, Pimpao, Simione, Zhang and Zita (2014) with the Ministry
of Commerce’s database and FACIM; in Nigeria we supplemented ORBIS with VConnect; in Tan-
zania we supplemented Sutton and Olomi (2012) with the Ministry of Trade database; in Zambia
we supplemented Sutton and Langmead (2013) with the Zambia Association of Manufacturers. In
Myanmar we supplemented the PEDL Enterprise Map with industry directories and lists of manu-
facturers provided by the Myanmar Industry Association (see Tanaka, 2015) and in Nicaragua we
used business directories and an IADB database.
These databases all provide sufficient information on companies to conduct a stratified telephone
survey (company name, address, and a size indicator). They also typically have some accounting
information on employment, sales, and capital. We did not insist on having accounting information
to form the sampling population, however.
Representativeness of the sampling frame
How representative are our sampling frames of the underlying population of manufacturing firms?
For most of the countries we have evidence that the data is reasonably comprehensive. For example,
when comparing aggregate employment in the ORBIS populations to those from census data, we
usually find a reasonably close match (e.g. Kalemli-Ozcan et al, 2015; Bloom, Draca and Van
Reenen, 2015).
In Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012b) we analyze this in more detail. For example, we compare
the number of employees for different size bands from our sampling frame with the figures for the
corresponding manufacturing populations obtained from national census data from each of the
countries where this is available. There are several reasons for a mismatch between Census data
and firm level accounts.46 Despite these potential differences, our sampling frame appears to cover
in Japan, covering all public and all private firms with one of the following: 150 or more employees, 10 million US$
of sales, or 20 million US$ of assets.
46First, even though we only use unconsolidated firm accounts, employment may include some jobs in overseas
branches. Second, the time of when employment is recorded in a census year will differ from that recorded in
firm accounts. Third, the precise definition of “enterprise” in the census may not correspond to the “firm” in
company accounts. Fourth, we keep firms whose primary industry is manufacturing whereas census data includes only
plants whose primary industry code is manufacturing. Fifth, there may be duplication of employment in accounting
databases due to the treatment of consolidated accounts. Finally, reporting of employment is not mandatory for the
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near to the population of all firms for most countries. 47
Mismatch between the true population and our sampling frame could be a problem if our sampling
frame was non-randomly omitting firms - for example under-representing smaller firms - because it
would bias our cross-country comparisons. We tried several approaches to address this. First, in
almost all the regression tables we include country fixed effects to control for any differences across
countries in sample selection bias. Hence, our key results are identified by within country variation.
Second, we ran experiments where we dropped problematic countries (e.g. Portugal and Sweden)
from the analysis to show that the results are robust.
It is harder to make such comparisons between our sampling frame and the full population of firms
in some of the poorer countries as there is no reliable employment aggregate numbers to compare
to. The enterprise maps by Sutton and others that we draw our sampling frames from are probably
the most reliable sources. Given this, we should interpret some of the results from the African
countries with more caution than those of the other nations.
Medium sized manufacturing firms vs. all manufacturing firms
A further concern that is that even if our sampling frame is fully comprehensive, the proportion of
employment covered by medium sized firms differs systematically across countries. Using Census
sources on firm populations, Table A3 shows the employment distribution for the countries where
it is available. Firms employing between 50 and 5,000 workers account for about half of all man-
ufacturing workers in most countries, although the proportion was larger in some countries such
as Ireland (72%) and Poland (71%). The proportion employed by very large firms with over 5,000
workers varies more between nations. The patterns are broadly consistent with our MAT model.
In countries where competition is strong and reallocation easier, there is a larger fraction of jobs
in very large firms (e.g. 34.7% in the U.S.) and a small fraction in small firms with under 50
employees (e.g. 16.2% in the U.S.). Germany, also a high productivity and high management score
country, looks similar to the U.S. (34.9% in large firms vs. 16.5% in small firms). By contrast, in
countries like Italy and Greece, only 6.4% and 6.2% of employees respectively are in these large
firms compared to 45.1% and 41.3% in small firms. In Appendix B we provide some corrections to
our cross country decompositions to deal with the fact that we are missing management scores in
the very large firms in some countries (e.g. the U.S. and Germany) compared to other countries,
like those in southern Europe. As expected, these corrections strengthen our overall findings as
the “corrected” relative average management scores for the U.S. and Germany rise compared to
southern Europe.
accounts of all firms in all countries. This was particularly a problem for Indian and Japanese firms, so for these
countries we imputed the missing employment numbers based on a regression of sales on employment for firms where
we had both variables.
47In two countries the coverage from accounting databases underestimates the aggregate: the Swedish data covers
only 62% of Census data and the Portuguese accounting database covers 72%. This is due to incomplete coverage in
ORBIS of these smaller nations.
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A caveat to Table A3 is that total employment in firms with over 5,000 workers is not disclosed
in all countries (because of concerns it would reveal individual firm’s identities). In the U.S. and
Japan we have the exact Census numbers from public use tables and in the U.K. we had access
to confidential Census micro-data to do this ourselves. In the other countries we used accounting
data from ORBIS and other sources to estimate employment for the very large firms. Since these
firms are so large, data is relatively plentiful as they are almost all publicly listed and so followed
closely by market analysts. 48
A.2 The World Management Survey
In every country the sampling frame for the management survey was all firms with a manufacturing
primary industry code and that employed between 50 and 5,000 workers49 on average over the most
recent three years of data prior to the survey.50Interviewers were each given a randomly selected list
of firms from the sampling frame. The size of this sampling frame by country is shown in column
(5) of Table A2 for the first year that we interviewed a firm. We have conducted the surveys over
multiple years as noted in column (6) of Table A2. The five major waves were in 2004, 2006,
2009/10, 2013 and 201451, although we had smaller scale surveys in some of the intervening years
(e.g. China in 2007; Brazil, Canada and Ireland52 in 2008).
In the first survey in 2004 we covered 732 firms in France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S.53 In
2006 we covered eight countries (China, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Poland, Portugal and Sweden)
as well as the four core countries. In addition to the new countries and a refreshment sample
of the four 2004 countries we also re-contacted all firms from 2004 to form a short panel. In
2009/10 we again resurveyed all firms interviewed 2006 including the original 2004 firms (if they
were still alive). For budgetary reasons we did not do a refreshment sample in this wave although
48Corrections have to be made to estimate the number of domestic employees (which is the Census concept) if this
is not revealed directly by the firms. To do this we ran country specific regressions of the proportion of domestic over
total global employment on a polynomial of total employment, industry dummies, and multinational status. Then
we used this to impute the number of domestic workers for the firms who did not disclose domestic employment.
49In Japan and China we used all manufacturing firms with 150 to 5000 employees since Oriana only samples
firms with over 150 employees.Note that the Oriana database does include firms with less than 150 employees if they
meet the sales or assets criteria, but we excluded this to avoid using a selected sample. We checked the results by
conditioning on common size bands (above 150 in all countries) to ensure that the results were robust.
50In the U.S. only the most recent year of employment is provided. In India, employment is not reported for private
firms, so for these companies we used forecast employment, predicted from their total assets (which are reported)
using the coefficients from regressing ln(employees) on ln(assets) for public firms.
51Major waves were started in early summer, but sometimes stretched throughout the year. In 2009, the wave
stretched through to the following February. We kept information on when the interview took place to control for
any seasonal influences (a noise control).
52We split out Northern Ireland from the rest of the U.K. in Table A2 as we did an additional wave specifically of
Northern Irish firms in 2008. Some of the Northern Irish firms were also surveyed in 2004, 2006 and 2010 as part of
the general U.K. waves, but only a smaller number as the region is only a small part of the U.K..
53This sample was drawn from the BVD Amadeus dataset for Europe and the Compustat dataset for the U.S. Only
companies with accounting data were selected. So, for the U.K. and France, this sampling frame was very similar
to the 2006 sampling frame. For Germany it is more heavily skewed towards publicly quoted firms since smaller
privately held firms report little balance sheet information. For the U.S. it comprised only publicly quoted firms. As
a robustness test we drop the firms that were resurveyed from 2004.
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we did add New Zealand and Australia. In 2013 we mainly surveyed low income countries in Africa
(Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia) and Latin America (Colombia and
Nicaragua) for the first time. But we also followed Argentina, Mexico and Brazil in the panel and
surveyed Spain and Turkey for the first time. In 2014 we included new countries (Kenya, Myanmar
and Vietnam) and performed refreshment samples of the U.S. and the main EU countries (France.
Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the U.K.). This included attempting to re-survey all the
panel firms from the these EU countries and the U.S. that we had from earlier waves.
The Survey response rate
Column (4) of Table A2 shows the response rates by country. Of the firms we contacted 41% took
part in the survey, a high success rate given the voluntary nature of participation. Of the remaining
firms, 16% refused to be surveyed, while the remaining 43% were in the process of being scheduled
when the survey ended.
There are clear differences by country, with the response rate being lowest in Japan and highest in
Nigeria. Table A4 analyzes the probability of being interviewed.54
All columns condition on country dummies, industry dummies and time dummies (for year of
interview and year the accounting data is taken from if different). The first column simply includes
employment as a measure of size. The size variable is significant suggesting that there was a
tendency for large firms to respond more frequently, although the coefficient is not large: a doubling
of firm size is associated with only a 6% higher probability of response.
In column (2) we add in labor productivity and reassuringly find that firms with higher revenues
per employee are not significantly more likely to agree to be interviewed than others. Column (3)
includes the return on capital employed (ROCE) as an alternative performance measure which is
also insignificant. These are important results as they suggest we are not interviewing particularly
high or low performing firms. In columns (4), (5) and (6) we find that multinational status, firm
age, and capital are also all insignificant in the selection equations.
So, in summary, within a country, industry, and year, respondents were not significantly more
productive, profitable, or capital intensive than non responders. Respondents did tend to be slightly
larger, but were not more likely to be older or multinationals. Since all regressions include size,
country, industry, and time dummies, this potential source of bias is controlled for.
One concern, however, is that when we make cross country comparisons these selection effects
could create biases. Hence in our decomposition analysis we re-weight the data to allow for country
specific sampling bias (see Appendix B and main text). Specifically, we ran probits of whether a
54The responders sample is smaller than the total number of observations in Figure 1 for three reasons. First, we
look only at the first time we contact a firm: this is because firms that appear in the panel are likely yo be better
managed and more productive (since they survived longer). Second, we conduct the analysis at the levels of the firm’s
accounts and there may be multiple plants analyzed for the same firm in the same year. Third, we do not include
Singapore because (as noted above) we do not have access to the non-responders.
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firm responded compared to others in the sampling frame where the right hand side variables are
employment, firm age, industry dummies and time dummies. We then calculated the probability
of sample response and used the inverse of the sampling probability as weights (winsorizing the top
and bottom percentiles).
Management panel data
As described above, we have a panel element to the database. This is built by combining the
management survey waves with the accounting panel data, and then interpolating (but never ex-
trapolating) the management data to fill in the missing years. For example, if we measure man-
agement practices every three years, we linearly interpolate the data in the intervening years. This
helps to increase the sample sizes for the five year difference moment since we do not need to have
exactly five years between survey waves (for example, without interpolating, if we survey firms
every three years we can never generate a five year difference). But, to confirm our results are
not dependent on interpolating, we can replicate Table 3 using non-interpolated data finding very
similar results.55All regression standard errors are clustered by firm so that the standard-errors are
appropriately corrected for any potential serial correlation in the errors induced by interpolation.
In terms of sample size we have 6,114 firm-year observations between 2004 and 2014 inclusive
for the non-interpolated data and 12,146 firm-year observations between 2004 and 2014 inclusive
for the interpolated data, so that about 49.7% of the firm-years have interpolated management
data (the accounts data is never interpolated). Finally, we also have about 5% of firm-years with
multiple survey values, for which we take the average value of all continuous variables (including all
the overall management score) and the value from the chronologically first survey for the discrete
values (e.g. “plant county of location”, “ownership type” etc). The panel covers 15 countries -
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Poland, Portugal,
Sweden, UK and US.
Firm-level variables
We have firm accounting data on sales, employment, capital, profits, shareholder equity, long-term
debt, market values (for quoted firms), and wages. We also collected information on whether
the firm was part of a multinational enterprise during the survey interview. We supplemented
and verified this information through BVD, web searches, and direct telephone inquiries to the
firms. We also collected specific questions on the multinational status of the firm (whether it
owned plants abroad and the country where the parent company is headquartered) to be able to
distinguish domestic multinationals from foreign multinationals.
55For example, the coefficients (standard errors) on management for columns (1) to (4) from Table 3 with non-
interpolated data are 0.274 (0.017), 0.142 (0.015), 0.123 (0.016) and 0.038 (0.014) respectively.
34
We collected many variables through our survey, including information on plant size, skills, orga-
nizational structure, etc. as described in the main text. We asked managers to estimate how many
competitors they thought they faced, and used this information to construct one of the firm level
competition variables.
Management practices were scored following the methodology of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007),
with practices grouped into four areas: operations (three practices), monitoring (five practices),
targets (five practices), and incentives (five practices). The shop-floor operations section focuses on
the introduction of lean manufacturing techniques, the documentation of processes improvements,
and the rationale behind introductions of improvements. The monitoring section focuses on the
tracking of performance of individuals, reviewing performance, and consequence management.56
The targets section examines the type of targets, the realism of the targets, the transparency
of targets, and the range and interconnection of targets. Finally, the incentives section includes
promotion criteria, pay and bonuses, and fixing or firing bad performers, where best practice
is deemed the approach that gives strong rewards for those with both ability and effort. Our
management measure averages the z-scores of all 18 dimensions and then z-scores this average
again.
Industry level variables
Our basic industry code is the U.S. SIC (1997) three digit level - which is our common industry
definition in all countries except otherwise noted. We allocate each firm to its main three digit
sector (based on sales), covering 135 unique three-digit industries. There are at least ten sampled
firms in each industry for 97% of the sample.
The “Lerner index of competition” is constructed, as in Aghion et al (2005), as the cross-firm
median of (1-profit/sales) in a country-industry-time period cell. Profits are defined as EBIT
(earnings before interest and taxation) to include the costs of labor, materials, and capital, but
exclude any financing or tax costs. The source of accounting data used to build the index is ORBIS
population data for all countries (i.e. we do not condition on having any management data). We
first build the median Lerner index for every country-industry-year cell.57 We then average the
yearly values over three three-years sub-periods: period 1, including years between 2004 and 2006;
period 2, including years between 2008 and 2010; and period 3, including 2012 and 2013 data (2013
being the last year for which we have full ORBIS extractions). This timing roughly corresponds
to pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. These time varying measures of the Lerner index are
matched to the management interviews according to the year in which these were conducted (2004-
2006 for period 1; 2008-2010 for period 2; and 2012-2014 for period 3).
The variable “Import penetration” is built using data drawn from the World Input-Output Database
56Since the operations and monitoring concepts overlap we often group them together as “monitoring”.
57To reduce the influence of outliers, we drop observations below the 1th and above the 99th percentile of the
Lerner index.
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(WIOD). Import penetration is built as the share of imports over apparent consumption (total
production-exports+imports). This measure is built at the country by industry by year level and
then, similarly to the Lerner index, averaged across sub-periods. Since the last available year for the
WIOD is 2011, we use only two sub-periods, 2004-2006 (matched with management data collected
between 2004-2006) and 2008-2010 (matched with management data collected between 2008-2014).
The industry classification is ISIC, Rev 3.
The variable “Import penetration from China” is built exactly as the “Import Penetration” variable,
except that it includes only imports originating from China in the numerator.
Tariff data was kindly supplied by Feenstra and Romalis (2015) and is at the country by industry
(SITC, Rev 4) by year (2000-2006) level. Since we have limited time series variation, we collapse
the data to the country by industry level.
Country level variables
We take country level measures of GDP per capita and TFP from the latest Penn World Tables
(Timmer et al, 2015). The OECD “Difficulty of Hiring” index (ranging from 1 to 100) is the variable
EPRC V2 (available for all years in the interval 1998-2013), and is drawn from their indicators of
employment protection. These are synthetic indicators of the strictness of regulation on dismissals
and the use of temporary contracts, compiled from 21 items covering three different aspects of
employment protection regulations as they were in force on January 1st of each year. We also
employ the variable “Cost to export (US$ per container)” drawn from the World Bank “Doing
Business” dataset (2015) which reflects the cost of obtaining export licenses and average container
costs.
A.3 Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS)
MOPS was jointly funded by the U.S. Census Bureau and the National Science Foundation as
a supplement to the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). The original design was based on
the same concepts as the WMS and was adapted to the U.S. through several months of devel-
opment and cognitive testing by the Census Bureau. It was sent by mail and electronically to
the ASM respondent for each establishment, which was typically the accounting, establishment, or
human-resource manager. Most respondents (58.4%) completed the survey electronically, with the
remainder completing the survey by paper (41.6%). Non-respondents were given up to three follow-
up telephone calls if no response had been received within three months. The survey comprised 36
multiple choice questions about the establishment, taking about 20 to 30 minutes to complete. The
survey included 16 questions on management practices covering (like WMS) monitoring, targets
and incentives.
The monitoring section asked firms about their collection and use of information to monitor and
improve the production process. For example, firms were asked how frequently performance indi-
cators were tracked at the establishment, with options ranging from “never” to “hourly or more
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frequently”. The targets section asked about the design, integration, and realism of production
targets. For example, firms were asked what the time-frame of production targets was, ranging
from “no production targets” to “combination of short-term and long-term production targets”.
Finally, the incentives section asked about non-managerial and managerial bonus, promotion and
reassignment/dismissal practices. For example, it asked how managers were promoted at the es-
tablishment, with answers ranging from “mainly on factors other than performance and ability, for
example tenure or family connections” to “solely on performance and ability”. The full question-
naire is available on http://bhs.econ.census.gov/bhs/mops/form.html.
In our analysis, we aggregate the results from these 16 check box questions into a single measure of
structured management. The structured management score is the unweighted average of the score
for each of the 16 questions, where each question is first normalized to be on a 0-1 scale. Thus
the summary measure is scaled from 0 to 1, with 0 representing an establishment that selected the
bottom category (little structure around performance monitoring, targets, and incentives) on all
16 management dimensions, and a 1 representing an establishment that selected the top category
(an explicit focus on performance monitoring, detailed targets, and strong performance incentives)
on all 16 dimensions. As with WMS, we asked a range of questions about the characteristics of the
workers, firms, and collected variables that we used to approximate for interview noise (interviewee,
interview and interviewer characteristics).
The MOPS survey was sent to all ASM establishments in the ASM mail-out sample. 37,177
filled surveys were received, implying a response rate of 78%, which is extremely high for firm
surveys.We further restricted the sample for establishments with at least 11 non-missing responses
to management questions and also have positive value added, positive employment and positive
imputed capital in the ASM. In addition to our management data we use establishment level data
on sales, value-added and labor inputs from the ASM. The mean establishment size is 167 employees
and the median is 80. The average establishment in our sample has been in operation for 22 years,
44% of managers and 9% of non-managers have college degrees, 13% of their workers are in unions,
42% export and 69% are part of larger multi-plant firms.
More details on the MOPs survey are contained in Bloom et al (2016).
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B APPENDIX: FURTHER RESULTS
In Section 5 we decompose share-weighted management into reallocation and unweighted average
components and use this to estimate the contribution to cross country TFP. In doing that, we
made a variety of assumptions that we now relax to see if they materially alter our results. Recall
that the sample we used in the analysis is a sub-sample of that underlying Figure 1 as we drop
multinationals because it is unclear what the appropriate measure of size is for such firms (we also
show robustness to including multinationals). Also, we weight the management data according to
a firm’s country-specific employment share and adjust for non-random selection through sampling
weights.
B.1 Differential response rates to the survey
There are several potential sources of sample selection, the most obvious one being that the firms
who responded from the sampling frame were non-random in some dimension. Appendix A exam-
ined the overall evidence on sampling bias and argued that these were relatively small both on the
observable and unobservable dimensions. Nevertheless, the baseline results in Table 7 control for
this by calculating (country-specific) weights for the sample response probabilities. We do this by
running country-specific probit models where the control variables are ln(employment size), firm
age, a dummy for whether the firm was publicly listed and industry dummies. We chose these con-
trols because they are available for responders and non-responders, and there was some evidence
from Appendix A that larger firms were more likely to respond. We then calculated the weights as
the inverse of the probability of response.
We experimented with an alternative first stage probit to look into sample response bias, based
on just using employment rather than the larger set of controls. The results are summarized in
Table 8. Row 1 presents a summary of the baseline results that we use in Table 7. Row 2 shows
what happens when we drop pre-2006 data. This is motivated by the fact that 2004 was our first
(and smallest) survey wave. The fraction of the TFP gap accounted for by management rises to
33% (from 30%). We also show in column (6) that the correlation of this fraction explained with
the baseline in row 1 is very high (0.992) and the correlation of the gaps in management with the
baseline of Row 1 are also very high (0.998 in column (3)). Row 3 drops all observations which are
in the panel part of the dataset except the first year. The motivation for doing this is that firms who
have been in the panel for one year are more likely to respond in subsequent years than a randomly
chosen firm. Since we attempt to re-sample panel firms in subsequent years this could potentially
generate a bias. In the baseline results of Row 1 we down weight these firms appropriately using
estimate from the probits. Row 3 shows that our results are robust to just dropping them from
the sample (32% of TFP accounted for). We also looked at the sensitivity of the first stage probit
to the controls by dropping all covariates except size (row 4) and not using any sample weights
(row 5). Not using any selection correction generates the smallest fraction of the TFP explained in
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Table 8 (20%).
In Table 7, we dropped multinationals because of the difficulty of measuring group size appropriately
for such companies. To check the robustness of these results, we included them in row 6, but also
included multinational status into the selection equation used to calculate the sample response rate
weights (multinationals were slightly more likely to participate in the survey). We account for a
bit less of the average TFP gap (24% compared to 30% in the baseline) and the cross country
correlation remains reasonably high (0.89).
We have focused on employment as our key measure of size as it is simple, a volume indicator which
is straightforward to measure across countries. An alternative way to measure size is to look at a
measure of weighted inputs, so we follow Bartelsman et al (2013) and construct a measure using
capital stock information from Orbis where our composite input measure was exp[0.7*ln(labor) +
0.3*ln(capital)]. The results are in row 7 of Table 8 and are again are similar to the baseline,
although with slightly more of TFP accounted for by management (34.5%).
B.2 Sampling biases associated with dropping very small and very large firms
Our management surveys focus on medium sized firms defined as those with over 50 and under
5000 employees. This was in order to compare firms of a broadly similar size. However, it could
potentially cause bias in our comparisons of management levels across countries as the size distri-
bution is different across nations (e.g. Garicano, Lelarge and Van Reenen, 2013, and Table A3).
Obviously we do not know the exact distribution of management scores in these very large and
very small firms, but we can estimate with additional assumptions what the potential biases could
be.
From the census manufacturing population databases of firm demographics, in most countries we
know the number of firms above and below 50 employees, and the total number of workers employed
across firms of different sizes (see Table A3). We need to then make an assumption about the
relationship between firm size and management for the very large and very small firms, which we
extrapolate off the size-management relationship over the part of the distribution that we observe
(50 to 5,000 employees). We checked that the extrapolated size-management relationship holds for
firms below 50 and above 5,000 using the MOPs dataset which asks management questions to firms
from all parts of the U.S. size distribution (Bloom et al, 2016).58
We then use this information to estimate the weighted average management score across the entire
distribution. Our preferred method exploits the fact that the firm size distribution in each country
follows a power law (Axtell, 2001). Using results from this literature we can approximate the
employment weighted mean management score in the sub-population under 50 workers and the
58The coefficient on ln(employment size) in the management regression is 0.25. We considered imposing a common
constant on each country (-1.46) or adjusting this to be consistent with the country-mean management score in the
50 to 5,000 range. Both methods lead to similar results.
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sub-population with over 5,000 workers.59 We then use the information in Table A3 to calculate
the mean management score across the entire size distribution. Results of this exercise are in rows
8 and 9 of Table 8. We first reproduce the baseline results on the smaller sample of countries in
row 8 of Table 8. In this sub-sample of 14 countries (13 differences as the U.S. is the base) we
account for a higher fraction of TFP (41%) since these are OECD countries. We then implement
the size correction. The correlation between our baseline management scores and the new “size
corrected” management scores is very high (0.925), as is the correlation of the fraction of TFP
explained (0.968). If anything, we account for an even higher fraction of the TFP gap (just under
50%) when making this correction.
B.3 Manufacturing TFP vs. Whole Economy TFP
The management scores are derived from manufacturing firms, but the decompositions in Table
7 use economy wide TFP. This is purely due to data restrictions - there are few countries in
the world for which it is possible to construct reliable measures of manufacturing TFP that are
comparable across countries. Our assumption is that countries with high economy wide TFP also
have high manufacturing TFP. To test whether this might bias our results, we draw on estimates of
manufacturing specific TFP levels (Citino, Haskel and Van Reenen, 2016). This is based primarily
on the KLEMs data and constructs TFP in the same way as the Penn World Tables, correcting for
capital services and skills. There are only seven countries that overlap between the two exercises
where data is sufficiently rich: Australia, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, the U.K. and U.S. The
correlation of manufacturing TFP (relative to the U.S.) for these countries with economy TFP is
reassuringly high: 0.938. The average proportion of the TFP gap accounted for by management is
35%, similar to the overall mean (but smaller than the proportion for just the seven countries in
the baseline which is 43%).60
C APPENDIX: SMM DETAILS
SMM starts by selecting an arbitrary starting value of the parameter vector to be estimated (θ).
The dynamic program is then solved and the policy functions are generated. These policy functions
are used to create a simulated data panel of size (µN, T ), where µ is a strictly positive integer, N
is the number of firms in the actual data, and T is the time dimension of the actual data. The
59First, we consider the approximation in Johnson et al (1994) showing that the number of employees in each size
“bin” is equal when the bins are logarithmically sized if firm size is distributed according to Zipf’s Law (which is
approximately true in the data). We predict management in each bin and then employment weight the bin to obtain
mean management for the below 50 and above 5,000 firms. We also considered the continuous version of the power
law which lead to similar results.
60We performed a similar exercise for the market sector (i.e. dropping health, education and public administration).
For this sample we do not have Australia, but we do can add France. Again the correlation of TFP between this
sector (market sector) and total economy is high at 0.844. We could account for 43.6% of the cross country TFP
gaps, very similar to the fraction for these seven countries in Table 7 (44.7%).
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simulated moments ΨS(θ) are calculated on the simulated data panel, along with an associated
criterion function Γ(θ), where Γ(θ) = [ΨA−ΨS(θ)]′W [ΨA−ΨS(θ)], which is a weighted distance61
between the simulated moments ΨS(θ) and the actual moments ΨA.
θ̂ = arg min
θ∈Θ
[ΨA −ΨS(θ)]′W [ΨA −ΨS(θ)] (7)
A second parameter value is then drawn by taking a random jump from the first value, and the third
parameter value onwards is drawn by taking a random jump away from the best prior guess (the
parameter value that has delivered the lowest criterion function up to that point). This way, the
parameter estimate θ̂ derived by randomly searching over the parameter space to find the parameter
vector, which minimizes the criterion function. This simulated annealing random jumping approach
is used because of the potential for discontinuities in the model and the discretization of the state
space (so a gradient minimization approach may simply find a local rather than a global minimum).
Finally, different initial values of θ are selected to ensure the solution converges to the global
minimum.
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TABLE A1: MANAGEMENT PRACTICES QUESTIONNAIRE 
Any score from 1 to 5 can be given, but the scoring guide and examples are only provided for scores of 1, 3 and 5. The survey also includes a set of Questions that 
are asked to score each dimension, which are included in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). 
(1)  Modern manufacturing, introduction 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: Other than Just-In-Time (JIT) delivery from 
suppliers few modern manufacturing 
techniques have been introduced, (or have 
been introduced in an ad-hoc manner) 
Some aspects of modern manufacturing 
techniques have been introduced, through 
informal/isolated change programs 
All major aspects of modern manufacturing have been 
introduced (Just-In-Time, autonomation, flexible 
manpower, support systems, attitudes and behaviour) in 
a formal way 
(2) Modern manufacturing, rationale 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: Modern manufacturing techniques were 
introduced because others were using them. 
Modern manufacturing techniques were 
introduced to reduce costs 
Modern manufacturing techniques were introduced to 
enable us to meet our business objectives (including 
costs) 
(3) Process problem documentation 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: No, process improvements are made when 
problems occur. 
Improvements are made in one week 
workshops involving all staff, to improve 
performance in their area of the plant 
Exposing problems in a structured way is integral to 
individuals’ responsibilities and resolution occurs as a 
part of normal business processes rather than by 
extraordinary effort/teams 
(4) Performance tracking 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: Measures tracked do not indicate directly if 
overall business objectives are being met. 
Tracking is an ad-hoc process (certain 
processes aren’t tracked at all) 
Most key performance indicators are tracked 
formally. Tracking is overseen by senior 
management.  
Performance is continuously tracked and communicated, 
both formally and informally, to all staff using a range of 
visual management tools. 
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(5) Performance review 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: Performance is reviewed infrequently or in 
an un-meaningful way, e.g. only success or 
failure is noted. 
Performance is reviewed periodically with 
successes and failures identified.  Results are 
communicated to senior management. No 
clear follow-up plan is adopted. 
Performance is continually reviewed, based on indicators 
tracked.  All aspects are followed up ensure continuous 
improvement. Results are communicated to all staff 
(6) Performance dialogue 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: The right data or information for a 
constructive discussion is often not present 
or conversations overly focus on data that is 
not meaningful. Clear agenda is not known 
and purpose is not stated explicitly 
Review conversations are held with the 
appropriate data and information present. 
Objectives of meetings are clear to all 
participating and a clear agenda is present. 
Conversations do not, as a matter of course, 
drive to the root causes of the problems. 
Regular review/performance conversations focus on 
problem solving and addressing root causes. Purpose, 
agenda and follow-up steps are clear to all. Meetings are 
an opportunity for constructive feedback and coaching. 
(7) Consequence management 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: Failure to achieve agreed objectives does 
not carry any consequences 
Failure to achieve agreed results is tolerated 
for a period before action is taken. 
A failure to achieve agreed targets drives retraining in 
identified areas of weakness or moving individuals to 
where their skills are appropriate 
(8) Target balance 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: Goals are exclusively financial or 
operational 
Goals include non-financial targets, which 
form part of the performance appraisal of top 
management only (they are not reinforced 
throughout the rest of organization) 
Goals are a balance of financial and non-financial 
targets. Senior managers believe the non-financial 
targets are often more inspiring and challenging than 
financials alone. 
(9)  Target interconnection 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
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Scoring grid: Goals are based purely on accounting 
figures (with no clear connection to 
shareholder value) 
Corporate goals are based on shareholder 
value but are not clearly communicated 
down to individuals 
Corporate goals focus on shareholder value. They 
increase in specificity as they cascade through business 
units ultimately defining individual performance 
expectations. 
(10) Target time horizon 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: Top management's main focus is on short 
term targets 
There are short and long-term goals for all 
levels of the organization. As they are set 
independently, they are not necessarily 
linked to each other 
Long  term goals are translated into specific short term 
targets so that short term targets become a "staircase" to 
reach long term goals 
(11) Targets are stretching 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: Goals are either too easy or impossible to 
achieve; managers provide low estimates to 
ensure easy goals 
In most areas, top management pushes for 
aggressive goals based on solid economic 
rationale. There are a few "sacred cows" that 
are not held to the same rigorous standard 
Goals are genuinely demanding for all divisions. They 
are grounded in solid, solid economic rationale 
(12) Performance clarity 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: Performance measures are complex and not 
clearly understood. Individual performance 
is not made public 
Performance measures are well defined and 
communicated; performance is public in all 
levels but comparisons are discouraged 
Performance measures are well defined, strongly 
communicated and reinforced at all reviews;  
performance and rankings are made public to induce 
competition 
(13) Managing human capital 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: Senior management do not communicate 
that attracting, retaining and developing 
talent throughout the organization is a top 
priority 
Senior management believe and 
communicate that having top talent 
throughout the organization is a key way to 
win 
Senior managers are evaluated and held accountable on 
the strength of the talent pool they actively build 
(14) Rewarding high-performance 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: People within our firm are rewarded 
equally irrespective of performance level 
Our company has an evaluation system for 
the awarding of performance related rewards 
We strive to outperform the competitors by providing 
ambitious stretch targets with clear performance related 
accountability and rewards 
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(15) Removing  poor performers 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: Poor performers are rarely removed from 
their positions  
Suspected poor performers stay in a position 
for a few years before action is taken 
We move poor performers out of the company or to less 
critical roles as soon as a weakness is identified 
(16) Promoting high performers 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: People are promoted primarily upon the 
basis of tenure 
People are promoted upon the basis of 
performance 
We actively identify, develop and promote our top 
performers 
(17) Attracting human capital 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: Our competitors offer stronger reasons for 
talented people to join their companies 
Our value proposition to those joining our 
company is comparable to those offered by 
others in the sector. 
We provide a unique value proposition to encourage 
talented people join our company above our competitors 
(18) Retaining human capital 
Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Scoring grid: We do little to try to keep our top talent. We usually work hard to keep our top talent. We do whatever it takes to retain our top talent. 
Source: Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) 
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TABLE A2: 
SAMPLING FRAME SOURCES AND SAMPLE RESPONSE RATES BY COUNTRY 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CODE Name Primary Source % responding 
#Contacted 
 & eligible Years 
AR Argentina BVD ORBIS 42.26 892 2010; 2013 
AU Australia Dun & Bradstreet 33.24 1357 2009 
BR Brazil BVD ORBIS 45.45 1727 2008;2013 
CA Canada BVD ORBIS 34.4 1218 2008 
CL Chile ENIA 70.55 550 2009 
CN China BVD ORBIS 43.91 1273 2007;2010 
CO Colombia Business Ministry 49.28 345 2013 
ES Spain BVD ORBIS 29.8 708 2013 
ET Ethiopia IGC Enterprise Map 60.65 216 2013 
FR France BVD ORBIS 41.93 1047 2004;2006;2009;2014 
GB Great Britain BVD ORBIS 29.2 2661 2004;2006;2009;2014 
GE Germany BVD ORBIS 33.81 1121 2004;2006;2009;2014 
GH Ghana IGC Enterprise Map 78.69 122 2013 
GR Greece BVD ORBIS 53.96 782 2006;2010;2014 
IN India CMIE FIRSTSOURCE 2005 43.42 1177 2006,2008;2010 
IR Ireland BVD ORBIS 42.97 384 2008 
IT Italy BVD ORBIS 48.31 888 2006;2010;2014 
JP Japan BVD ORBIS 17.33 554 2006;2010 
KE Kenya BVD ORBIS 66.91 272 2013 
MM Myanmar PEDL Enterprise Map 65.04 226 2014 
MX Mexico BVD ORBIS 39.81 967 2010;2013 
MZ Mozambique IGC Enterprise Map 81.06 132 2013 
NC Nicaragua Business Directories 80.2 101 2013 
NG Nigeria BVD ORBIS 90.98 122 2013 
NI Northern Ireland BVD ORBIS 62.98 181 2008 
NZ New Zealand Dun & Bradstreet 44.19 344 2009 
PO Poland BVD ORBIS 37.44 649 2006;2010 
PT Portugal BVD ORBIS 53.72 363 2006;2010;2014 
SG Singapore Trade & Industry Ministry 66.08 398 2012 
SW Sweden BVD ORBIS 40.42 819 2006;2010 
TR Turkey BVD ORBIS 81.92 177 2013 
TZ Tanzania IGC Enterprise Map 29.14 3092 2013 
US United States BVD ORBIS 38.92 388 2004;2006;2009;2014 
VN Viet Nam BVD ORBIS 64.36 101 2014 
ZM Zambia IGC Enterprise Map 42.26 892 2013 
ALL 40.93 25,345 
Notes: This tables contains some descriptive statistics of the countries in our database and the primary source of the sampling frame (more 
details are in Appendix A). Column (3) is the response rate (proportion of eligible and contacted firms who responded). “All” in the last 
row is the average across the entire sampling frame – i.e. weighted by number of firms contacted rather than simple unweighted average 
across countries (not including Singapore). Final column is main years included in survey. 
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TABLE A3: 
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS IN DIFFERENT FIRM SIZE CLASSES ACROSS COUNTRIES 
% workers in firms with: France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Poland Portugal Sweden GB US 
Under 50 employees 30.1% 17.8% 41.4% 28.3% 45.2% 23.9% 27.2% 51.4% 23.8% 36.2% 16.2% 
Between 50 and 5,000 employees 48.6% 52.8% 53.9% 71.7% 48.6% 58.6% 71.0% 47.8% 54.4% 49.3% 49.1% 
Over 5,000 employees 21.3% 29.4% 4.6% 0.0% 6.2% 17.5% 1.8% 0.7% 21.9% 14.5% 34.7% 
Notes: This table displays estimates of the distribution of employment in manufacturing across firms in different size classes. The WMS sampling frame covers medium sized 
firms (between 50 and 5,000 workers) which usually covers half or more of total workers. The US (2006) and Japanese (2007) data are from published Census Bureau data and 
UK data (2010) is our analysis of unpublished Census data. For the other countries we use Eurostat data (which is based on Census) for the proportion of employment in firms 
with under 50 employees. For disclosure reasons, the proportion of employees in firms in over 5,000 employees is not reported in public use tables, however. Consequently, we 
used other data sources to estimate this fraction since we know the total manufacturing employment and we have access to the employment of the largest firms in every country 
from ORBIS company accounts data. Details are in Appendix B. 
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TABLE A4: RESPONSE RATES TO SURVEY 
Dependent Variable: Responded = 1 (0 otherwise) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Employment) 0.062*** 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.059*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Ln(Labor Productivity) 0.008 
(0.010) 
Return on Capital Employed -0.013 
(0.011) 
Multinational subsidiary? 0.009 
(0.026) 
Ln(Firm age) 0.014 
(0.013) 
Ln(Capital) 0.013 
(0.009) 
#  firms/observations 24,921 24,921 24,921 24,921 24,921 24,921 
Notes: ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and *10% level. Marginal effects and standard errors from Probit ML. The dependent variable =1 if the firm 
responded to our survey and zero otherwise. An observation is the first a firm was contacted (so subsequent panel observations are not included, not are multiple plants in the 
same year which is why there are fewer observations than in the entire database). Years are 2006 to 2014 (see Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, for analysis of the 2004 data). All 
regressions include three digit industry dummies, country dummies and year dummies (for survey response year and year that accounting data is taken from). Missing values 
on accounting variables are set to zero and a dummy for missing value included in the regression. Number of observations is 1,534 less than Table A1 because Singapore not 
included since we do not have details on covariates of non-responders from sampling frame. 
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TABLE A5: MANAGEMENT AND SUPPLY OF SKILLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Management 
% Employees with 
college 
Management Management 
Method OLS OLS OLS IV 
Drive time to nearest -0.044*** -1.634*** 
University/B-School (0.016) (0.359) 
% Employees with 0.008*** 0.027*** 
college in the firm (0.001) (0.008) 
Observations 6,406 6,406 6,406 6,406 
Notes: *** significance at the 1%, 5% (**) or 10% (*) level. Estimates by OLS with standard errors clustered by (313) sub-national regions. All columns include local population 
density, distance to coast, weather, firm age, skills, noise controls (interviewer dummies, reliability score, the manager’s seniority and tenure and the duration of the interview), 
a full set of three digit industry dummies, regional and year dummies, and a full set of country dummies.  Management is a z-score of the average z-scores of the 18 management 
questions.  See Feng (2013) for more details on distance measures. IV in column (4) is the drive time to nearest university 
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